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BLACK ON BLACK REPRESENTATION
ALEXIS HOAG*
When it comes to combating structural racism, representation matters, and this is
true for criminal defense as much as it is for mental health services and education.
This Article calls for the expansion of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of
choice to indigent defendants and argues that such an expansion could be of particular benefit to indigent Black defendants. Extending choice to all indigent defendants reinforces the principles underlying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and can help strengthen the attorney-client relationship. Because an expansion
would grant defendants the autonomy to request counsel who they believe would
best represent them, Black defendants who prioritize racial congruency and cultural competency may select Black counsel. Empowering indigent Black people to
select, should they desire, Black and/or culturally competent public defenders has
the potential to offer a range of benefits, including mitigating anti-Black racism in
the criminal legal system.
Methodologically, this Article takes multiple approaches. First, it connects indigent
representation to existing literature from other fields-clinical therapy and education-both of which recognize the benefits of racial congruency, to support the
argument that Black public defenders may benefit Black clients. To explore how
same-race representation functions in practice, this Article also relies on qualitative
interviews with Black public defenders regarding communication and trust, factors
that the American Bar Association identifies as integral to criminal defense.
Together, these approaches highlight how expanding choice to indigent defendants
might impact Black defendants, something that past choice of counsel literature
does not examine. The Article concludes that recruiting more Black public
defenders and training culturally competent lawyers are critical next steps regardless of whether the Court expands the right to counsel of choice to people who

qualify for appointed counsel.
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INTRODUCTION

In interpreting the Sixth Amendment's assistance of counsel pro-

vision, the United States Supreme Court recognized multiple rights,
including the right to counsel, 1 the right to conflict free counsel, 2 the
right to effective counsel, 3 the right to represent oneself, 4 and the right
to counsel of choice. 5 However, the Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence limits only one of these rights based on an individual's
6
ability to afford representation: the right to counsel of choice. The

Court has repeatedly recognized that the right to counsel of choice
"does not go beyond 'the individual's right to spend [their] own
1 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (finding that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees all indigent defendants the right to counsel when facing criminal
prosecutions).
2 See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159-60 (1988) (describing conflict free
counsel as an unwaivable right).
3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984) (recognizing that the right to
counsel includes the right to effective counsel, and establishing the cause and prejudice
standard to determine effectiveness).
4 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
5 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
6 Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159 ("The Sixth Amendment right to choose one's own counsel is
circumscribed in . . [that] a defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he
cannot afford .... ").
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money to obtain the advice and assistance of . . . counsel.'" 7
According to the jurisprudence, an indigent person's right to counsel

is satisfied so long as appointed counsel is competent and capable of
rendering adequate services. 8 Thus, if an indigent person is dissatisfied
with counsel for some reason, unless counsel is incompetent or their

conduct is constitutionally ineffective, the individual has no other
options. In short, beggars can't be choosers.
The Court's income-based distinction in counsel of choice cases
does not comport with the principles underlying the Sixth
Amendment. Autonomy, which cuts across income levels, is one such

principle. 9 For instance, the Court recognized that "a defendant must
be allowed to make [their] own choices about the proper way to protect [their] own liberty." 10 This should include the selection of counsel,
as defense counsel is central to protecting a person's liberty interests

in the face of criminal charges.1 1 Similarly, in McCoy v. Louisiana, the
Court reaffirmed that the defendant has the "right to make the fundamental choices about [their] own defense." 12
Central to representation is a trusting relationship. 13 As Justice

Brennan explained, "crucial decisions . . . can best be made, and
counsel's duties most effectively discharged, if the attorney and the

defendant have a relationship characterized by trust and confidence." 14 An attorney-client relationship lacking trust can be corro7 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) (citation
omitted); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006) ("[A]n
element of [the Sixth Amendment] is the right of a defendant who does not require

appointed counsel to choose who will represent him.") (citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159); Luis
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1089 (2016) (plurality opinion) ("[A]n indigent defendant,
while entitled to adequate representation, has no right to have the Government pay for his
preferred representational choice.").
8 See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 624 (finding that indigent defendants "have no

cognizable complaint so long as they are adequately represented by attorneys appointed by
the courts").
9 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819 (explaining that the Sixth Amendment "grants to the

accused personally the right to make his defense" (emphasis added)); see also Jones v.
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 763 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (identifying autonomy and
dignity as central to a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights).
10 Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017).
11 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 69 ("Left without the aid of counsel [the defendant] ...

lacks

both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings

against him.").
12 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1511 (2018).
13 See MATTHEW CLAIR, PRIVILEGE AND PUNISHMENT: How RACE AND CLASS
MATTER IN CRIMINAL COURT 16-24 (2020) (describing the central importance of the
lawyer-client relationship to the client's decisionmaking regarding their case).
14 Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 21 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Linton v.

Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981) ("[B]asic trust between counsel and client . .. is a
cornerstone of the adversary system.")).
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sive to representation and amount to the denial of counsel. 15 Yet,
where a relationship of trust between counsel and the defendant is
paramount to effective representation, an indigent defendant can only
hope for a trusting, communicative relationship with appointed
counsel. 16 In instances where trust fails to form and a breakdown in
communication occurs, indigent defendants run the risk of being stuck
with what they could not pay for.17
Differences in race, ethnicity, and culture between counsel and an

indigent defendant can create barriers to relationship building, communication, and trust formation.1 8 It is at this junction-the right to
counsel of choice and race-where this Article resides. This Article
calls for the Court to expand the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of

choice to indigent people and argues that the expansion could be of
particular benefit to Black indigent defendants.
Black people are overrepresented in the criminal legal system,

the majority of whom are indigent and qualify for public defenders or
appointed counsel.1 9 Given the lack of racial diversity in the legal pro15 See Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1198 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that
defendant's complete loss of trust in his attorney amounted to denial of counsel).

16 Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1089 (2016) (plurality opinion) (recognizing
that the "close working relationship between lawyer and client" requires "confidence" and
"trust"); see also Daniels, 428 F.3d at 1198-200 (granting habeas relief where defendant
was effectively denied counsel due to complete breakdown in communication and trust

between defendant and appointed counsel).
17 See McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 932 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917
(1982) (finding that defendant's loss of trust and lack of confidence in appointed counsel
did not constitute denial of defendant's right to counsel); Shaw v. United States, 403 F.2d
528 (8th Cir. 1968) (finding lack of rapport and breakdown in communication between
defendant and appointed counsel insufficient to constitute ineffective representation where

counsel was otherwise skilled and competent); Thomas v. Wainwright, 767 F.2d 738, 742
(11th Cir. 1985) (holding that "defendant's general loss of confidence or trust in his
counsel, standing alone, is not sufficient" to justify substituting defense counsel). But see

Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 1970) (granting habeas relief for denial of
right to counsel where trial court forced defendant to trial, over defendant's motions for

substitute counsel, with appointed counsel with whom there was a complete breakdown in
the relationship).
18 See, e.g., Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in
Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REv. 33, 42 (2001) ("Lawyers and clients who do not share the
same culture face special challenges in developing a trusting relationship in which genuine
and accurate communication can occur."); Christopher Campbell, Janet Moore, Wesley
Maier & Mike Gaffney, Unnoticed, Untapped, and Underappreciated:Clients' Perceptions

of Their Public Defenders, 33 BEHAV. Scis. & L. 751, 764 (2015) (finding that differences in
class and race between defendants and public defenders contributed to distrust); CLAIR,
supra note 13, at 74 (noting that cultural mismatch between lawyer and client "tends to be
grounds for mistrust").
19 In 1996, court appointed counsel represented 82% of defendants in felony cases in
state courts in the nation's largest counties, and in 1998, they represented 66% of
defendants in federal court. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., DEFENSE
COUNSEL

IN

CRIMINAL

CASES 1 (2000). In 1997, appointed counsel represented 76.6% of
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fession, the system overwhelmingly appoints white lawyers to
represent indigent Black clients. 20 For instance, over 70% of assistant
federal public defenders are white, with white men making up the
largest subgroup at 40.5%; among Criminal Justice Act attorneys who
federal courts appoint to represent indigent defendants, approximately 80% are white. 21 The existence of anti-Black bias among
defense counsel is well-documented. 22 Anti-Black bias in the attorneyclient relationship can lead to distrust and misunderstanding, corrode
representation, and further reinforce anti-Black racism within the

incarcerated Black people in state court and 64.7% of Black people in federal court, a
higher percentage relative to white and Hispanic defendants in both state and federal
courts. Id. at 9. The New York Times noted that "[r]oughly four out of five criminal
defendants are too poor to hire a lawyer and use public defenders or court-appointed
lawyers." Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Jugal K. Patel, One Lawyer, 194 Felony Cases, and No
Time, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), https://nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/31/us/publicdefender-case-loads.html. In federal court, for fiscal year 2016, the ethnic breakdown of

defendants was 53.3% Hispanic, 20.4% Black, and 22.3% white. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N,
UNITED

STATES SENTENCING

COMMISSION QUARTERLY DATA REPORT: FISCAL YEAR

2016, at 6 (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
federal-sentencing-statistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC-2016_Quarterly
ReportFinal.pdf. Notably, Hispanic defendants are overrepresented in federal criminal
cases because they comprise 96% of immigration cases. See id.
20 AM. BAR Ass'N, ABA PROFILE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 33 (2020) ("In
2020,
86% of all lawyers were non-Hispanic whites, a decline from 89% a decade ago."); id.
("Nearly all people of color are underrepresented in the legal profession .... For example,
5% of all lawyers are African American . . . but the U.S. population is 13.4% African
American."); see also CLAIR, supra note 13, at 113 (noting that 75% of public defenders in
Boston are white); NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND
INJUSTICE IN AMERICA'S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 17 (2016) (finding that 69% of Cook
County's public defenders are white, whereas 80% of the indigent clients were either Black

or Hispanic).
21 2017 REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ACT

179-80, 181 (2018), https://cjastudy.fd.org/sites/default/files/public-resources/Ad%20Hoc%
20Report%2OJune%202018.pdf ("[R]oughly 80 percent of responding [Criminal Justice
Act] panel attorneys identified as white and male, and more than 60 percent report being

50 years of age or older.").
22 See L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender
Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2634-41 (2013) (recognizing that implicit bias impacts the way
public defenders evaluate evidence, interact with clients, and accept punishment on behalf
of clients); Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death
Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1545-55 (2004) (describing an empirical study
in which lawyers more readily identified white faces with "good" and Black faces with
"bad"); Joseph J. Avery, Jordan Stark, Yiqiao Zhong, Jonathan D. Avery & Joel Cooper, Is
Your Own Team Against You? Implicit Bias and Interpersonal Regard in Criminal Defense,
J. SOC. PSYCH. 1 (2020) (finding in a study of criminal defense attorneys in forty-three U.S.
states that criminal defense attorneys harbor significant implicit bias for white defendants
and against Black defendants in ways that impact interpersonal relationships between the
client and attorney).
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criminal legal system.23 In one study exploring bias in the legal system,
the authors mused: "If police, prosecutors, jurors, judges, and defense
attorneys all harbor anti-[B]lack preferences, then the system would
appear to have limited safeguards to protect [B]lack defendants from
bias." 24
As a solution, this Article calls for the expansion of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel of choice for all indigent defendants.
Extending choice to indigent defendants reinforces the principles
underlying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and can help
strengthen the attorney-client relationship. Given the focus of this
Article, the expansion would also grant a defendant the autonomy to
request counsel who shares their race and/or to select culturally com-

petent counsel 25 if they believed that lawyer could best represent
them. Empowering indigent Black people to select, should they
desire, Black and/or culturally competent public defenders also has
the potential to help mitigate anti-Black racism in the criminal legal
system. Current choice of counsel literature does not explore the
impact an expansion could have on indigent Black defendants, nor
does indigent defense literature address the potential benefits of racial
congruency in representation.
Black lawyers often have the experiential knowledge of what it is
like to move through the world with the social meaning attached to

Blackness and thus, firsthand knowledge of the corresponding treat27
ment and dangers. 26 I call this "embodied empathy." As a result,
many Black public defenders have a greater ability to understand and
empathize with the stressors and circumstances that resulted in the

criminal charges their clients face, and to recognize the humanity in
their clients. This embodied empathy enables many Black defenders
to build rapport more readily with their clients and to establish trust,
both of which can contribute to improved representation. Constitunote 13, at 74-75; GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 20, at
counsel often perpetuate and participate in the court's
appointed
that
(explaining
169-73
racist framework when determining for which clients to zealously advocate).
24 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does
23 See CLAIR, supra

Unconscious Racial Bias Affect TrialJudges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1222 (2009).

25 Defined here as a lawyer's ability to recognize the impact that race, ethnicity, and
culture have on the client and the client's experiences, combined with the self-awareness of
the significance race, ethnicity, and culture have on the lawyer. See, e.g., Scharlette

Holdman & Christopher Seeds, Cultural Competency in Capital Mitigation, 36 HoFSTRA L.

883, 886-87 (2008).
26 A central tenet of Critical Race Theory is that people of color have "a presumed
competence to speak about race and racism" given "their different histories and
RACE
experiences with oppression." RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL
THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 11 (3d ed. 2017).
27 See discussion infra Part III.
REV.
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tionally effective representation depends upon a trusting attorney-

client relationship. 28 And as this Article demonstrates, Black clients
tend to form a more trusting relationship with Black counsel given the

shared social meaning assigned to race in this country. 29
Although indigent defendants from other non-dominant ethnici-

ties and cultures can benefit from culturally competent representation,
this Article focuses on the potential impact expanding counsel of
choice may have on indigent Black people facing criminal charges.
The overrepresentation of Black people in the criminal legal system
reflects longstanding structural racism born from slavery and the
racial hierarchy that resulted. 30 It also stems from the strength of anti-

Black bias that stereotypes Black people as dangerous and criminal. 3 1
These stereotypes are direct descendants of slavery, which produced a
racialized caste system. In her book, Caste, journalist Isabel Wilkerson
explains: "What people look like, or, rather, the race they have been

assigned or are perceived to belong to, is the visible cue to their
caste." 3 2 The public then relies on caste as an "historic flash card" to

determine "how [people] are to be treated, where they are expected
to live, ... [and] whether they may be shot by authorities with impunity." 33 Historian Khalil Muhammad calls it "racial criminalization:

the stigmatization

of crime

as '[B]lack"'

while simultaneously

28 See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977)
(explaining that "mutual trust" between the attorney and client is "necessary to effective
representation"); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.

29 See discussion infra Part IV.
30

See, e.g.,

DOUGLAS

ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK

A.

BLACKMON,

AMERICANS

SLAVERY

BY

ANOTHER

FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD

NAME:

THE

RE-

WAR II 53 (2008)

("Beginning in the late 1860s, and accelerating after the return of white political control in
1877, every southern state enacted an array of interlocking laws essentially intended to
criminalize [B]lack life."); SAIDIYA V. HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION: TERROR,
SLAVERY, AND SELF-MAKING IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 126-30 (1997)

(describing the criminalization of Black idleness as a tool for the nation to transition away
from slave labor into punitive free labor).
31 See N. Jeremi Duru, The CentralParkFive, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the

Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDozo L. REV. 1315, 1320 (2004) (exploring the myth of Black
men as "animalistic, sexually unrestrained, [and] inherently criminal" that began during
Reconstruction and persists in the criminal legal system); see also Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct.
759, 776 (2017) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel where defense counsel injected
the "powerful racial stereotype-that of [B]lack men as 'violence prone'"-into trial for
jury's consideration (quoting Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986) (plurality opinion))).
32 See ISABEL WILKERSON, CASTE: THE ORIGINS OF OUR DISCONTENTS 18 (2020); see
also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 350-51 (1987) ("The social meaning of racial

segregation in the United States is the designation of a superior and an inferior caste, and
segregation proceeds 'on the ground that colored citizens are ...

inferior and degraded."'

(citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
33 WILKERSON, supra note 32, at 18-19.
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34
"masking . . . crime among whites as individual failure." Studies
35
show that police stop and question Black people at higher rates;
prosecutors file more serious charges when the suspect is Black and

the victim is white; 36 defense attorneys are more likely to recommend

plea bargains for Black clients that impose longer sentences than

37
those they would recommend for similarly situated white clients; and

judges and juries impermissibly consider race when determining
38
whether to convict and what sentence to impose.
Foundationally, to support the argument that Black public
defenders can offer potential benefits to Black clients, this Article
relies on existing literature from other fields-clinical therapy and
education-both of which recognize the benefits of same-race representation. To explore how same-race representation functions in practice, this Article relies on interviews with Black public defenders

34

KHALIL

THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS:
URBAN AMERICA 3 (2010).

GIBRAN MUHAMMAD,

AND THE MAKING OF MODERN

RACE, CRIME,

35 See Emma Pierson et al., A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparitiesin Police Stops

Across the United States, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 736, 737 (2020) (reporting, based on a
study surveying data on approximately 255 million police stops, that "among state patrol
stops, the annual per-capita stop rate for [B]lack drivers was 0.10 compared to 0.07 for
white drivers; and among municipal police stops, the annual per-capita stop rate for

[B]lack drivers was 0.20 compared to 0.14 for white drivers"); Devon W. Carbado,
(E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 976-77 (2002) (describing why

Black men are likely to be stopped by police at higher rates, even in a racially integrated
neighborhood).
36 See Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit RacialBias on the
Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 796-97, 822 (2012)

(concluding that implicit racial bias likely impacts prosecutor decisionmaking at multiple
points, including whether to charge or release someone, determining what crime to charge,

bail determinations, disclosure of exculpatory evidence, plea bargaining, jury selection, and
closing argument). For a general discussion on the role race plays in a prosecuting
attorney's exercise of discretion, see Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power
and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998).
37 Vanessa A. Edkins, Defense Attorney Plea Recommendations and Client Race: Does
Zealous RepresentationApply Equally to All?, 35 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 413, 422 (2011).
Interestingly, the study found that attorneys did not necessarily see their Black clients as
more guilty when recommending a plea with a longer sentence-they actually perceived
their white clients as more guilty. Id. When asked about likeliness of the client having
committed the crime (and after the study made race salient) attorneys may have been

compensating "to appear unbiased and egalitarian." Id.
38 See Justin D. Levison, Huajian Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty By Implicit RacialBias:
The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 187, 204 (2010)
(finding significant association between Black and guilty among participants in implicit
association test study); Rachlinski et al., supra note 24, at 1221 (administering the implicit
association test to state court judges and finding that they harbor implicit racial bias, that it

impacts their decisionmaking, but that when prompted about racial bias, the judges were
motivated to suppress their bias and appeared to do so).
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regarding communication and trust 39-factors that the American Bar
Association identifies as integral to criminal representation. 40
Existing choice of counsel scholarship does not examine how

expanding choice to indigent defendants might impact Black defendants. Most of the literature questions the appropriateness and
legality of an income-based distinction, and, based on different theories, argues that the Court should extend choice to indigent people. 41
39 In partnership with the Black Public Defender Association (BPDA), I disseminated

a brief online survey to BPDA members inquiring about public defender racial
demographics, cross-cultural representation training, recruitment efforts for ethnically
diverse attorneys, and whether subjects would be willing to receive follow up contact. I

followed up with a subset of Black public defenders who answered in the affirmative, and I
conducted individual web-based video interviews with them. I asked each subject openended questions about their perception of the relevance of their race in representing Black
clients, the formation of the attorney-client relationship, communication, and the
development of trust. I conducted these interviews with the approval of Columbia

University's Institutional Review Board and the financial support of Columbia Law
School. Citations to these recordings will be marked as "Defender No. _," numbered in

the order in which the interviews took place.
40 See CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE DEF. FUNCTION,

Standard 4-3.1(a)

(AM. BAR

("Immediately upon appointment or
retention, defense counsel should work to establish a relationship of trust and confidence
with each client."); Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance
of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913, 1005 (2003)
[hereinafter ABA Death Penalty Guidelines] (Guideline 10.5.C: "Counsel at all stages of

Ass'N 2017) [hereinafter ABA

STANDARDS]

the case should engage in a continuing interactive dialogue with the client concerning all
matters that might reasonably be expected to have a material impact on the case .... "); see
also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 21 & n.4 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[C]ounsel's

duties [are] most effectively discharged, if the attorney and the defendant has a
relationship characterized by trust and confidence." (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-3.1(a) (2d ed. 1980) (stating that "[n]othing is more fundamental to
the lawyer-client relationship than the establishment of trust and confidence")).
41 See Peter W. Tague, An Indigent's Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L.

REv. 73, 87-99 (1974) [hereinafter Tague, Right to Attorney of Choice] (advancing an equal
&

protection argument for extending right to counsel of choice); Stephen J. Schulhofer
David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting Effective Representation
Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 76 (1993) (recommending "free market for defense services" where

indigent defendants can choose their lawyers to address inherent conflict of interest of
state-funded indigent defense); Wayne D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the
Indigent Criminal Defendant: Do Reimbursement Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to
Counsel of Choice for the Indigent?, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 181, 224-29 (1998) (suggesting
reimbursement system to extend counsel of choice to poor people to advance
constitutional values); Peter W. Tague, EnsuringAble Representationfor Publicly-Funded
Criminal Defendants: Lessons from England, 69 U. CIN. L. REv. 273, 277 (2001)

(advocating for adoption of England's voucher scheme, enabling indigent defendants to
hire a lawyer of their choice to "better align the lawyer's incentives with the defendant's");
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Client Choice for Indigent Criminal Defendants: Theory and
Implementation, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 505 (2015) (explaining theoretical underpinnings
of indigent client choice and conventional objections, discussing client-choice model in

practice, and suggesting expansion); Robert E. Toone, The Absence of Agency in Indigent
Defense, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 25 (2015) (relying on agency theory to help balance control
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For instance, thirty years ago, David Friedman and Stephen
Schulhofer argued that extending the right would likely improve the
attorney-client relationship, both because the client would be able to
exercise agency and the lawyer would have "a self-interested reason to
value the satisfaction of his client." 42 Although this Article agrees that
extending choice could improve representation, it takes the analysis a
step further by elevating the importance of the attorney-client relationship when examining the doctrine. It also argues that extending
choice may be particularly beneficial to indigent Black defendants
should they choose a Black and/or culturally competent lawyer. In
those instances, there is potential to mitigate anti-Black racism in the
system. Conversely, existing scholarship makes brief mention of how
43
race may impact the attorney-client relationship and representation.

This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the history and
principles underlying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which
are tied to Black people and indigency, arguing that the Court must
extend the right to counsel of choice to make good on the constitutional guarantee. Part II asserts that representation matters, exploring
same-race relationships in clinical therapy and education to provide a
framework for advancing Black on Black representation in indigent
defense. Part III defines embodied empathy, the unspoken familiarity
among Black people given their shared experience with the social
meanings assigned to race. Through firsthand accounts from Black
public defenders, Part IV explores how Black on Black representation
can impact the formation of the attorney-client relationship, including
the quality of communication and the development of trust. This Part
also argues that same-race representation may help mitigate anti-

Black racism in the criminal legal system and identifies some of the
limitations of same-race representation. The Article concludes with a
recommendation that recruiting more Black public defenders and
between indigent client and appointed counsel and to help improve indigent defense
services); John Rappaport, The Structural Function of the Sixth Amendment Right to

Counsel of Choice, 2016 Sup. Cr. REV. 117, 118 (2016) (arguing that counsel of choice for
poor people should not be justified as advancing autonomy or fairness, but "as a weak,
system-level safeguard against socialization of the criminal defense bar"); Janet Moore,
The Antidemocratic Sixth Amendment, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1705, 1705 (2016) (arguing that

the Supreme Court's "no-choice" language is dicta and that the Court should extend the
right to poor people to promote democracy).
42 Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 41, at 104.
43 See Tague, Right to Attorney of Choice, supra note 41, at 80 n.41 (mentioning that

indigent defendants likely place greater trust and confidence in attorneys they choose,
racial issues if the indigent feels the
which is "particularly true in cases involving ...
attorney identifies in some way with him"); Schulhofer, supra note 41, at 534 (noting that a
"defendant may feel that he will be most comfortable ... with an attorney of his own race
[or] ethnicity").
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training culturally competent lawyers are critical next steps regardless

of whether the Court expands the right to counsel of choice to people
who qualify for appointed counsel.

I
THE SIXTH

AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE

The Sixth Amendment contains seven procedural protections for
those accused of committing a crime.44 This Article focuses on the

right to counsel, derived from these words: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." 45 Although today we view the right to
counsel as a central component of a fair trial and due process,46 the
legal system did not hold counsel in high regard until the 1920s and
'30s, when the Court began invalidating state criminal convictions for
violations of defendants' constitutional rights.47 Many of these cases
involved indigent Black defendants in the South, 48 including Powell v.
Alabama, which established the right to counsel and the right to
counsel of choice in 1932.49 The Court later elucidated that "[t]he
right to select counsel of one's choice," though not explicitly mentioned in the Amendment's text, is part of "the root meaning" of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 50 Relative to other aspects of the

Sixth Amendment, the counsel of choice doctrine is "young and
undertheorized." 51 Thus, it is instructive to examine the social and historical context of Powell v. Alabama to help identify the Court's moti44 Including the right to a speedy trial, a public trial, trial before an impartial jury, to
notice, of confrontation, to compulsory process, and to the assistance of counsel. U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.

45 Id.
46 See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984) ("An accused's right to be
represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system.").
47 See LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS iN AMERICA 243 (1939)
(discussing the increase in federal cases applying the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
48 See Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99

MIcH. L. REv. 48 (2000) (explaining that the Court's intervention in Black defendant cases
involving egregious Jim Crow "justice" in the South helped shape criminal procedure in
ways that would not have occurred had the cases involved marginal unfairness); see also A.

Leon Higgenbotham, Jr. & William C. Smith, The William B. Lockhart Lecture: The
Hughes Court and the Beginning of the End of the "Separate But Equal" Doctrine, 76

MINN. L. REV. 1099, 1121-22 (1992) (discussing the "Hughes Court's growing sensitivity to
the plight of [B]lacks in southern courts").
49 287 U.S. 45, 53, 68-71 (1932).
50 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147-48 (2006). In 2016, the Court
reaffirmed counsel of choice as part of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Luis v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1088 (2016) (holding that "pretrial restraint of legitimate,
untainted assets needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment").
51 Rappaport, supra note 41, at 120.
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vation in recognizing the right and to support an expansion of the
right to counsel of choice to indigent people.
A.

The Development of Indigent Defense

The prominence of defense counsel in securing and protecting the
rights of the accused came on the heels of the Progressive Era when
municipalities started delivering criminal defense services to lowincome people. Beginning in the 1910s, these efforts included
government-funded public defender offices5 2 and privately funded
volunteer defense services.5 3 Although each model provided legal ser-

vices to indigent people charged with crimes, the underlying philosophies differed. Government-funded defender systems represented
democracy and a necessary element of due process, a concept just
beginning to take form. 54 The rationale behind providing privately

funded counsel was to enable lawyers to operate independently of the
state, with a singular focus and loyalty to the client. The assumption
was that a government-funded defender system could not operate in
the best interest of low-income people because the government also
funded the prosecution. 55 What was clear about both models was that

the delivery of criminal defense services to low-income people was to
enable "equality before the law," relative to defendants who could
afford counsel. 56 The insistence on equal footing between indigent

defendants and those with means cuts against the contemporary classbased distinction in the right to counsel of choice.
52 See Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New

York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 581, 602 (1986-87) (describing the
establishment of institutional public defender offices in Los Angeles in 1914, and in
Portland, Oregon, Columbus, Ohio, and Omaha, Nebraska in 1915-16); LAW REFORM
COMM., THE ASs'N

OF THE BAR OF THE

CITY OF N.Y., THE

NECESSITY AND ADVISABILITY

OF CREATING THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 4-5 (1915),
details/necessityadvisab00asso [hereinafter NECESSITY & ADVISABILITY]

https://archive.org/

(discussing newly
created public defender agencies in Oklahoma and Los Angeles to determine whether
New York City should create one).
53 See SARA MAYEUx, FREE JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER IN
&

TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 50 (2020) (noting that elite lawyers in Philadelphia and
Boston operated privately funded voluntary defender systems); see also NECESSITY
ADVISABILITY, supra note 52, at 6 (describing privately funded defense services in
Portland, Oregon and Houston, Texas).
54 See MAYEUX, supra note 53, at 7 (arguing that the public defender and the right to

counsel as part of due process formed in tandem during the twentieth century).
55 See NECESSITY & ADVISABILITY, supra note 52, at 16-17 (discussing the inherent
conflict between the prosecution's goals and the goals of the accused). This same conflict of
interest concern serves as the contemporary rationale for extending counsel of choice to
indigent defendants. See supra note 41.
56 NECESSITY & ADVISABILITY, supra note 52, at 22.
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New York City was one example of a municipality engaged in the
debate over how best to deliver criminal defense services to lowincome people. Members of the New York City and New York State

Bar Associations constituted the primary voices in these conversations. 57 In 1917, Charles Evans Hughes was elected president of both

the New York State Bar Association and the Legal Aid Society.5 8 His
leadership in the development of indigent defense in New York City

helped shape his views in Powell, which the Court decided during his
tenure as Chief Justice. 59 Hughes firmly believed in providing "expert
legal advice" to the poor; without it, he argued "it is idle to talk of
equality before the law." 60 During his tenure leading the New York
State Bar Association, Hughes helped develop the Voluntary

Defenders Committee, 61 a privately funded indigent defense service,
which later merged with the Legal Aid Society, creating a permanent
criminal division to represent indigent people charged with crimes. 62
A decade and a half later, the Hughes Court (1930-1941) was the
first to focus on the rights of criminal defendants, helping to establish

and shape modern criminal procedure. 63 The Court's actions in these
cases also signaled an awareness of the unique experiences of Black
people in the criminal legal system. Jurist and scholar A. Leon
Higgenbotham, Jr. observed that these decisions demonstrated an
awareness that the legal system "treated [B]lack criminal defendants
far more harshly than their white counterparts, and that this harsh
treatment was not a figment of [B]lacks' imaginations."64 During the

1930s, the Court overturned multiple criminal convictions in cases
involving Black defendants and blatant injustices. These included
cases involving a trial judge refusing to allow defense counsel to ques57

Id.

367-68, 623 (1951) (noting that Hughes
also served as president of the New York City Bar Association).
59 Chief Justice Hughes "took the lead in reversing the [Scottsboro Boys'] convictions."
Id. at 724 (explaining that Hughes, "[i]n line with his policy of asking conservative judges
to write liberal opinions," assigned the decision to Justice George Sutherland).
58 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES

60 Id. at 383 (citing Hughes Calls Law Best Americanizer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1920, at

6).
61 The Voluntary Defenders Committee was an experimental program that offered

private lawyers to indigent defendants through the financial support of wealthy donors,
primarily John D. Rockefeller. See MAYEUX, supra note 53, at 50 (describing program).
Colloquially, these volunteer lawyers became known as "Rockefeller lawyers." Id.
62

Id.

63

See A.

LEON HIGGENBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLrICS AND

PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 160 (1996) ("The Supreme Court's

new direction in criminal justice matters became apparent shortly after Hughes became
Chief Justice in 1930.").
64 Higgenbotham, Jr. & Smith, supra note 48, at 1112.
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tion jurors about racial bias; 65 a coerced confession; 6 6 the exclusion of
Black people from juries;67 and the denial of the right to counsel. 68
The Court later extended the right to counsel to defendants facing
federal criminal charges.6 9
B.

Curtailing Legal Lynching

The Court's recognition of the right to counsel for the poor coin-

cided with its recognition of the right to counsel of choice in Powell v.
Alabama. 70 The case involved nine poor Black youths, falsely accused
of raping two white women in rural Alabama. 71 The trial judge techni-

cally appointed counsel, but counsel lacked the time and expertise to
provide adequate representation. After brief proceedings that could
be described as "trials" in name only, all-white juries sentenced all but
the youngest to death. 72 By the early 1930s, capital punishment had
largely replaced extrajudicial lynchings of Black people. 73 Lynchings,
which often occurred in public and with local law enforcement's tacit
approval or even participation,74 traumatized entire Black communi65 Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 311 (1931). Chief Justice Hughes wrote the
opinion overturning the defendant's conviction and death sentence. Id. at 309, 315.
66 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Chief Justice Hughes wrote the scathing,
unanimous opinion, holding that "[t]he rack and torture chamber may not be substituted
for the witness stand." Id. at 285-86. He further explained that "[i]t would be difficult to
conceive of methods more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the
confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis
for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process." Id. at 286; Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228, 242 (1940) (overturning the convictions where law enforcement
officials procured the coerced confessions).
67 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935) (holding systemic exclusion of Black
people from grand and petit juries violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Hale v.
Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 616 (1938) (per curiam) (same).
68 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-71 (1932).
69 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
70 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 53, 68-71 (granting constitutional right to counsel in criminal
trials and right to counsel of choice).
71 Id. at 48-52; Klarman, supra note 48, at 51 (noting that the youths ranged in age
from thirteen to twenty). For a detailed account of the legal proceedings, see generally
DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (2d ed. 2007).

72 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 50, 74 (challenging convictions based on the state's systematic
exclusion of Black people from the juries).
73

See GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, DEFYING DIXIE: THE RADICAL ROOTS

RIGHTS,

OF

CIVIL

1919-1950, at 126 (2008) (describing "[a] trial" as "a lynching in disguise"); James

W. Clarke, Without Fear or Shame: Lynching, Capital Punishment and the Subculture of

Violence in the American South, 28 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 269, 284 (1998) (explaining that
capital punishment, "a more palatable form of violence[,]" replaced lynching).
74 See SHERRILYN A. IFILL, ON THE COURTHOUSE LAwN: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY
OF LYNCHING IN THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 77-84 (2007) (describing instances where

"police officers determined whether a [B]lack man would face a trial or a lynch mob");
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 434
(Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Harris eds., Harper Collins Publishers 2014)

ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
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ties and spurred the Great Migration. 75 External pressure, including
from abroad, contributed to the sharp decrease in this so-called "mobjustice" by the late 1930s and early 1940s.76
Lynchings, and the hasty trials that replaced them, frequently
began with the alleged rape of a white woman by a Black man-or
groups of Black men, such as in Powell. 77 In reality, these allegations
frequently stemmed from an economic dispute, a perceived social
transgression, or a consensual interracial relationship.78 The state's
criminal legal system treated Black indigent defendants charged with
("Much Klan activity took place in those Democratic counties where local officials either
belonged to the organization or refused to take action against it."); see also United States
v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 571-72, 575 (1906) (finding Hamilton County, Tennessee Sheriff
Shipp, among other officials, in contempt of court for enabling the mob to lynch a Black
defendant in the sheriff's custody).
75 EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF

RACIAL TERROR 3 (3d ed. 2017), [hereinafter LYNCHING IN AMERICA] ("Terror lynchings

fueled the mass migration of millions of [B]lack people from the South into urban ghettos
in the North and West throughout the first half of the twentieth century."); ISABEL
WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNs 533 (2010) (noting that the number of

lynchings declined with each decade of the Great Migration as the number of Black people
leaving the South increased).
76 See PHIuP DRAY, AT THE HANDS

OF PERSONS UNKNOwN: THE LYNCHING OF

BLACK AMERICA 407-11 (2002) (showing that a combination of factors contributed to the

decline, including international opinion of America's hypocrisy of decrying human rights
abuses abroad while condoning human rights abuses at home); see also Barbara HoldenSmith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Progressive

Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 39-40 (1996) (explaining that the decrease in lynching
was not due to any state or federal intervention).

77 See, e.g., DRAY, supra note 76, at 4-5 ("Stories of sexual assault, insatiable [B]lack
rapists, tender white virgins, and manhunts led by 'determined men' that culminated in
lynchings [filled] ... the South's daily newspapers .... The cumulative impression was of a

world made precarious by Negroes."); GILMORE, supra note 73, at 125 (describing the rape
myth perpetuated by "upper-class white men [to] destroy[] the populist coalitions between
white and [B]lack working-class men by arguing that such interracial alliances put white
women at the mercy of [B]lack men's lust"); ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, REDEFINING RAPE:
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE ERA OF SUFFRAGE AND SEGREGATION 89-103 (2013) (arguing

that the racialization of rape-casting Black men as rapists and white women as victimsbegan to solidify in the 1880s, becoming a powerful tool to deny Black civil rights,
reinforce white supremacy, and justify the brutal execution of Black men for decades).
78 See GILMORE, supra note 73, at 98-99 (describing that "the first step in a lynching
was an African American's argument with a landlord or boss over earnings"; that
"established members of the [B]lack community" were also lynched for "run[ning] afoul of
white elites over some commercial transaction"; and that "poor [B]lack transients looking
for work often found themselves accused of crimes by people they had never met");
LYNCHING IN AMERICA, supra note 75, at 29 ("Through lynching, Southern white
communities asserted their racial dominance over the region's political and economic
resources-a dominance first achieved through slavery would not be restored through
blood and terror."); DRAY, supra note 76, at 7 (explaining that Ida Wells-Barnett, the
antilynching crusader and journalist, found that "in the majority of cases the charge of rape
was untrue, and had either been added to a complaint about a [B]lack suspect in order to
incense local white or,... to obscure [interracial] ... consensual sex" between a Black man
and white woman).
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non-capital offenses just as swiftly. 7 9 These quick, seemingly lawless
adjudications were not exclusively a Southern problem. 80 However,
after slavery, the region relied heavily on the criminal legal system to

facilitate Black people's virtual re-enslavement and to repopulate a
forced labor system through convict leasing and other exploitative
measures. 8 1
Given weak federal oversight, local officials needed only to pro-

vide defendants with the appearance of due process. 82 The federal
judiciary did not insert itself to enforce individuals' constitutional

83
rights in state criminal cases with regularity until the Hughes Court.
79 See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racism in American Courts: Cause for Black
Disruption or Despair?, 61 CAiLF. L. REv. 165, 176 (1973) (noting that Black defendants

"fared measurably poorer than their white counterparts" in criminal courts and that "cases
involving [B]lack defendants were generally heard in less time than those involving
whites").
80 See id. ("[A] Detroit study ... found that a significant number of defendants were
not advised of their rights. Black defendants were more likely than whites to have received

no proper indication of their charge, the right to testify, or the right to call and crossexamine witnesses."); id. at 177 (describing a Boston study revealing "shocking practices"
in criminal trial courts where the majority of defendants were Black and other ethnic
minorities, including that "defendants were not being adequately advised of their right to

counsel; . . . bail was set by reference to the charge and the defendant's prior record"
instead of relevant factors like "family ties, length of residence in the community and job
and financial resources").
81 See BLACKMON, supra note 30, at 57 (describing how "convict leasing adopted

practices almost identical to those emerging in slavery in the 1850s").
82 See GILMORE, supra note 73, at 126 (describing the threat to "[B]lack safety" in the
South as the appearance of "lawfulness"). For instance, consider the trial of Jesse
Washington, a Black teenager accused of murdering and sexually assaulting a white woman
in Waco, Texas. DRAY, supra note 76, at 216. The judge allowed the angry white mob
inside the courtroom. Id. at 217. The court-appointed attorney "failed to exploit the most
glaring weakness in the prosecution's case," and the jury swiftly sentenced Washington to

death. The mob immediately snatched Washington from the courtroom, placed a chain
around his neck, and strung him up on a tree near city hall. Id. at 217-18. Participants
lowered his lifeless body, lit him on fire, and later cut off his fingers, toes, and penis as
souvenirs. Id. at 218. Then, "a man on a horse lassoed the charred remains and dragged
them through town, followed by a group of young boys. The skull eventually bounced loose
and was captured by some of the boys, who pried the teeth out and offered them for sale."
Id.; see also Taken from the Court Room and Burned, EVENING TIMEs-REPUBLICAN, May
15, 1916, at 1 (describing the lynching of Jesse Washington).
83 See ORIED, supra note 47, at 243 (describing the Court's "develop[ing]" actions
"to insure a fair trial in the state courts" as "a vigorous and orthodox application of the
[D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the Fourteenth Amendment"). Notable exceptions included
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87, 92 (1923) (reversing state court proceedings, which,

"although a trial in form, were only a form, and that the [five Black] appellants were
hurried to conviction [for murder] under the pressure of a mob without any regard for
their rights and without according to them due process of law") and Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). In Strauder, the Court reversed a state criminal conviction,
holding that the state's exclusion of people from jury service on account of race violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 310. However, the Court's prohibition of excluding
Black people from juries was largely symbolic until the mid-twentieth century, when small
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Without protection from the federal courts, an indigent person, especially an indigent Black person, had little hope of retaining their con-

stitutional rights against the state's power. When the state prosecuted
death eligible offenses, the trials occurred before all-white and allmale juries,8 4 and often resulted in a conviction, death sentence, 85 and
rapidly scheduled execution. 86 Unquestionably, the defendant's access
to effective representation would have thrown a wrench in these kangaroo court proceedings. In fact, on appeal, indigent defendants often
raised claims challenging the appointment or effectiveness of counsel,
but "more shocking legal infractions such as mob-dominated trials and

coerced confessions" overshadowed them.87
Yet, the Southern bar, with few exceptions, was unwilling to provide quality defense services to poor Black people charged with
crimes, let alone capital crimes. 88 Community sentiment was such that
any local lawyer attempting to uphold the constitutional rights of
numbers of Black people began regularly serving on state and federal juries. See Alexis
Hoag, An Unbroken Thread: African American Exclusion from Jury Service, Past and
Present, 81 LA. L. REV. 55, 62-65 (2020).
84 EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A
CONTINUING LEGACY 12 (2010) (explaining that all-white juries continued to sentence

Black defendants to death into the 1980s, even after the Supreme Court outlawed systemic
exclusion of Black people from juries due to the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes);
see also Hoag, supra note 83, at 62-65.

85 See, e.g., Moore, 261 U.S. at 89; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 588 (1935); Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 279 (1936); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 615 (1938).
86 Between 1930 and 1972, 455 people were executed for rape. Of those, 405 (89.1%)
were Black. Moreover, 443 of the 455 of those executed were in former Confederate states.
Brief for ACLU et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554
U.S. 407 (2008) (No. 07-343), at 10 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF PRISONS,
NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS BULLETIN NO. 45: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1930-1968
(1969)).
87 See Shaun Ossei-Owusu, The Sixth Amendment Fagade: The Racial Evolution of the
Right to Counsel, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1161, 1191-92 (2019). For example, in Moore, 261
U.S. at 90-92-which stemmed from the 1919 Elaine, Arkansas massacre, in which white

mobs killed several Black people over a labor dispute-the Black defendants included a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in their writ of habeas corpus. Without giving the
claim any weight, the Court overturned the murder conviction of the Black defendant
based on the mob-dominated proceedings instead. Likewise, the Court overturned the
murder conviction for a Black defendant in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-87

(1936), due to a coerced confession even though the defendant also raised ineffective
assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to exclude the confession after the state
introduced it.
88 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIv. RTS., LAW ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL
PROTECTION IN THE SOUTH 184-88 (1965) [hereinafter U.S. COMM'N ON CIV. RTS. 1965
REPORT] (describing lack of local counsel in the South to represent Black people in
criminal and civil proceedings); see also David S. Mann, Not for Lucre or Malice: The
Southern Negro's Right to Out-of-State Counsel, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 143, 144 (1969) ("The
southern Negro's inability to obtain competent and vigorous counseling is primarily
attributable to a single phenomenon-the abdication by the southern bar of its obligation
to serve a disfavored minority.").
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Black defendants would likely have been met with violence or professional and social rejection. 89 Given the pervasive anti-Black racism in
the region, the Court's recognition of the right to counsel of choice in
Powell considered the defendants' particular need for counsel who
could elevate their humanity beyond the salacious criminal charges,
counsel who could provide meaningful and effective representation,
counsel who could see them.90 The Court's decision indicated that for

a fair trial to occur, the defendant needed to be empowered to select
their own lawyer, a lawyer who could provide effective representation
in the face of threats of violence from a "tense, hostile, and excited"

public. 91 The opinion repeatedly mentioned that the boys, all from out
of state, had neither friends nor relatives nearby to assist them. 92 In
short, there were no Black people around to come to their defense.
At the time, none of Alabama's law schools would accept, let

alone graduate, a Black student. 93 By the late 1930s, there were only
four Black lawyers in the entire state. 94 In 1925, the need for lawyers
willing to represent Black Alabamians was so great that Black people
formed the Protective

National Detective Association. 95 For an

annual membership fee, the Association provided Black Alabamians
free legal services in criminal and civil court until 1937, when the
Association ended. 96 The first Black lawyer in the Birmingham Bar
89 See, e.g., Mann, supra note 88, at 145 (explaining that the few southern lawyers
willing to represent Black people could be subjected to "a wide range of adverse responses
including social ostracism, loss of clients, loss of employment, trumped-up criminal
charges, the threat of disbarment, and physical violence" (citation omitted)).
90 Ava DuVernay named her Netflix series When They See Us, based on the true story
of five Black and brown teenagers falsely accused of raping a white woman in Central Park
in 1989, to force viewers to recognize the boys' individual humanity rather than lumping
them together, nameless, as "The Central Park Five," which is how the media, at best,
referred to them. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Implicit Bias in the Age of Trump, 133
HARV. L. REV. 2304, 2342-50 (2020) (reviewing JENNIFER L. EBERHARDT, BIASED:
UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE THAT SHAPES WHAT WE SEE, THINK, AND DO

(2019)). Countless comparisons have been made between the Central Park and Scottsboro
wrongful convictions. See, e.g., Duru, supra note 31.
91 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 51 (1932).
92 See id. at 52-53.
93 See UA Law School to Commemorate 45th Anniversary of First African-American
Graduates, UNIV. OF ALA. NEwS CTR. (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.ua.edu/news/2017/03/

ua-law-school-to-commemorate-45th-anniversary-of-first-african-american-graduates
(reporting that in 1972, Michael Figures, Booker Forte, Jr., and Ronald E. Jackson were
the first Black graduates of University of Alabama Law School); J. CLAY SMITH, JR.,
EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-1944, at 271-75 (1993)
(noting that the few Black lawyers practicing in Alabama between 1871 and 1944
graduated from Howard Law School, University of Michigan Law, Boston University
School of Law, LaSalle Extension University in Chicago, and Yale Law School).
94 SMITH, JR., supra note 93, at 274.
95 See id
96 See id.
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Association graduated from Howard Law School a decade and a half
later in 1947,97 and the first Black lawyer in Selma, also a Howard

graduate, started practicing in 1958.98 In fact, there was a dearth of
Black or friendly counsel anywhere in the region. 99 Over three

decades after the first of the Scottsboro trials, the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights reported that Southern lawyers and state officials
"continue[d] to distort the processes of public power so that Negro
citizens may not enjoy the legal equality promised them or exercise

the liberties assured them by the Constitution."100 The report noted
that the Southern bar's abdication of upholding and protecting the
rights of Black people in the justice system was "by no means exclusively a southern problem."1 01
With respect to the lack of Black representation, the Court

focused on the critical importance of counsel to a fair trial, referring to
defense counsel as "vital and imperative" to "due process within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."1 02 This was a relatively new

concept at the time. Although the trial judge had appointed counsel in
the case, the appointment was meaningless without the defendant's
"fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice" and sufficient
time for counsel to adequately prepare a defense.1 03 The Court's
insertion of choice in recognizing the right to counsel signaled that
autonomy was a significant part of actualizing the Sixth Amendment
right. Without autonomy to select their own lawyers, the defendants in
Powell were beholden to the trial court's selection, which in this
97 See Holcomb B. Noble, Oscar Adams, 72, a Pioneer As Alabama Top Court Justice,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/18/us/oscar-adams-72-a-

pioneer-as-alabama-top-court-justice.html (Oscar Adams later served as the first Black
judge of the Alabama Supreme Court, appointed in 1980 and elected in 1982, becoming the
first Black person to be elected to a statewide office).
98 See Bruce Weber, J.L. Chestnut Jr., Early Leader in Civil Rights Movement, Is Dead
at 77, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/us/0lchestnut.html

(describing the life of J.L. Chestnut, a Black lawyer who fought for civil rights and
practiced in Dallas County).
99 See Richard Hammer, 'Yankee Lawyer Go Home,' N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1967, at 8E

(explaining that "[t]here are too few Negro lawyers to handle the thousands of cases that
might have required counsel under the Sixth Amendment and Gideon" and that most
Southern white lawyers refuse to accept civil rights cases for fear of "social ostracism").

The dearth of Black lawyers was due to the lack of opportunity to attend graduate school,
which "meant that Black people were hard-pressed for justice in the courts." ADAM
HARRIS, THE STATE MUST PROVIDE: WHY AMERICA'S COLLEGES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN
UNEQUAL-AND HOw TO SET THEM RIGHT 85 (2021) (noting that there were only 1,230

Black lawyers compared to 159,375 white lawyers in 1934, meaning one Black lawyer per
9,667 Black people relative to one white lawyer for every 695 white people).
100 See U.S. COMM'N ON Cv. RTs. 1965 REPORT, supra note 88, at 184.
101 Id. at 187-88.

102 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65 (1932).
103 Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
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instance "amount[ed] to a denial of effective and substantial aid." 104
The decision indicated that in some instances, the trial court could not
be trusted to appoint counsel to adequately protect defendants' rights;
however, the defendant, whose life and liberty were at stake, could. 105
C.

Choice of Counsel Is a Central Component of the Right to

Counsel
In the decades following the Court's acknowledgement of the
right to counsel in Powell, there was no question that the defendant's
autonomy in selecting counsel was part of the constitutional guarantee. Even in reserving counsel of choice for those with means, the
Court reaffirmed that the right was firmly ensconced in the Sixth
Amendment's right to counsel. In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
the defendant sought to reverse his conviction after the trial court

erroneously denied his counsel of choice. 106 Although the government
conceded that the trial court's denial was erroneous, it disputed the
appropriate method of evaluating the violation. The government
argued that the violation was incomplete unless Gonzalez-Lopez
could show substitute counsel's performance was deficient and that he

was prejudiced by the deficiency under Strickland v. Washington's
two-prong ineffective assistance of counsel standard. 107 GonzalezLopez had not made such a showing, but it did not matter: The Court

disagreed with the government's position.
In reversing Gonzalez-Lopez's conviction, the Court reasoned
that "[t]he right to select counsel of one's choice . . . has been

regarded as the root meaning of the [Sixth Amendment] constitutional guarantee." 108 Therefore, the denial of the right to counsel of
choice constitutes a denial of the right to counsel, which is a structural

error requiring reversal, so no Strickland prejudice showing was necessary. The Court further explained that when the right to counsel is
disregarded, it does not matter that the trial-with substitute
counsel-was otherwise "fair." The right to counsel of choice "comId.
105 See Martinez v. Ct. of Appeal of Cal., Fourth App. Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 165 (2000)
104

(Scalia, J., concurring) ("Our system of laws generally presumes that the criminal

defendant . . . knows his own best interests and does not need them dictated by the
State.").
106 548 U.S. 140, 143-44 (2006).
107 Id. at 144-45 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-96 (1984) (defining
effectiveness)).
108 Id. at 147-48 (2006) (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)); see
also Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 336 (2014) (reasserting that the right to counsel

of choice "separate and apart from the guarantee to effective representation, [is part of]
'the root meaning' of the Sixth Amendment").
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mands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided-to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel
he believes to be best."1 09
In applying the structural error doctrine to counsel of choice, the
Court placed it firmly in the company of other "certain basic, constitu-

tional guarantees that . . . define the framework of any criminal
trial." 110 Therefore, the right to counsel of choice is one that
"'affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds,' rather than
being 'simply an error in the trial process itself "11 In so holding, the
Court elevated the right to counsel of choice to a foundational component of fairness in criminal adjudications. The Court reaffirmed as
much in Kaley v. United States a decade later: "[W]e have held that
the wrongful deprivation of choice of counsel is 'structural error,'
immune from review for harmlessness, because it 'pervades the entire
trial.' "112

That the right to counsel of choice is firmly positioned within the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel invites the question of why indigent defendants do not enjoy the same right. Upon learning that they
do not have the same right to choose their own lawyer as defendants
with means, Chief Justice Roberts asked: "Why not?" 113 The Court
has yet to fully answer that question.
D.

Beggars Cannot Be Choosers

Since deciding Powell, the Court has expressed limitations and
qualifications on the right to counsel of choice; principal among them
is that the defendant must be able to afford counsel. 114 Other limitations, such as judicial efficiency and adequacy of appointed counsel,
exist concurrently with poverty. Despite the Court's assertion that the
right to counsel is a necessity and not a luxury, 115 the right to counsel
of choice is a luxury for those who can afford it. According to the

Court, beggars cannot be choosers.
109 Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146.
110 Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017). Other examples of structural
error include using the defendant's coerced confession against the defendant in a criminal
trial, depriving the defendant of counsel, trying the defendant before a biased judge, and
denying the defendant a public trial.
111 Id. (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (alteration in original)).
112 Kaley, 571 U.S. at 336-37 (2014) (citing Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150).
113 Transcript of Oral Argument at 33-34, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S.

140 (2006) (No. 05-352).
114 See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140; Wheat, 486 U.S. at 153; Morris, 461 U.S. 1
(Brennan, J., concurring).
115 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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Limited Time
Much of the right to counsel of choice jurisprudence is concerned

116 A line of
with avoiding delay in the criminal adjudication process.
cases caution that the defendant's right is not absolute, and that a trial
court must weigh the right to counsel of choice "against the public's
11 7
However, effiinterest in the orderly administration of justice."

ciency over due process is in direct conflict with the reasoning in
Powell: Although the Court commended and encouraged prompt dispositions of criminal cases, it also cautioned that "a defendant ...

must not be stripped of his right to have sufficient time" to prepare for
trial with counsel of choice.1 18 Shortly after Powell, the Court again
acknowledged that the trial court must give appointed counsel sufficient time "to confer, to consult with the accused and to prepare his
defense"; otherwise, it "could convert the appointment of counsel into
a sham and nothing more than formal compliance with" the Sixth
Amendment.119

20
Efficiency and autonomy came to a head in Linton v. Perini.1
There, the trial court forced the defendant to proceed to trial with

appointed counsel after defendant's retained counsel requested a continuance to adequately prepare for trial. The reviewing court acknowl"the
edged that the two issues-"the right of choice of counsel" and
21 Howright to adequate time to prepare for trial"-were related.1
ever, in reversing the conviction, the Sixth Circuit prioritized choice,
holding "[i]t is axiomatic that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
enjoys the right to have assistance of counsel for his defense, and
116 See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 235 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (the right to counsel
of choice "cannot be insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct an orderly procedure in
courts of justice, and deprive such courts of the exercise of their inherent powers to control
the same"); Lofton v. Procunier, 487 F.2d 434, 435 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that a trial court
may refuse defendant's counsel of choice when "the attempted exercise of choice is
deemed dilatory" and may "compel a defendant to proceed with designated counsel").
117 Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981) superseded on other grounds by
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as recognized in Burton v. Renico, 391 F.3d 764 (6th Cir. 2004);
see also United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (same); Maynard v.
Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 1976) ("The right to counsel of one's choice is not

absolute. A court need not tolerate unwarranted delays, and may at some point require the

defendant to go to trial even if he is not entirely satisfied with his attorney."); United States
v. Saldivar-Trujillo, 380 F.3d 274, 277 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that the "public interest[] in
the prompt and efficient administration of justice outweigh[ed defendant's] right to
counsel of his choice").
118 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 45, 59; see also House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46 (1945)
(trial court failed to give defendant "a reasonable opportunity to consult with" defense
counsel), overruled by Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998).
119 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940).
120 656 F.2d 207.

121 Id. at 209.
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implicit in this guarantee is the right to be represented by counsel of
one's own choice."

122

To be clear, Mr. Linton could afford his lawyer

of choice, underscoring that the right to choose is still only reserved
for those with means.
The Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Linton makes clear that for a
defendant with means, the right to exercise autonomy outweighs judi-

cial efficiency. The reviewing court's assigned weight also speaks to
the defendant's

differing avenues for relief when a trial court

encroaches on either of the defendant's Sixth Amendment interests.
When the trial court forces substitute counsel on a defendant, the

defendant can allege that the court violated their right to counsel of
choice. However, when the trial court forces defense counsel to proceed without adequate preparation, the defendant's only recourse is

alleging that counsel's lack of preparation amounted to a violation of
the defendant's right to effective counsel. As discussed elsewhere,
relief under the latter challenge-that counsel's conduct was ineffec-

tive-is substantially more burdensome for the defendant to obtain. 123
The pedestal on which reviewing courts place a defendant's
autonomy should extend equally to defendants who qualify for
appointed counsel. Without the right to counsel of choice, an indigent
defendant is forced to go the second, more difficult route: challenging
counsel's conduct as ineffective. Few defendants, regardless of financial means, prevail on ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 124
Given this reality, the Court's refusal to extend counsel of choice
could have more to do with the Court's desire to quickly dispose of
such cases, a sort of doubling down on efficiency. Otherwise,
reviewing courts would be forced to grant new trials any time a trial
court denied an indigent defendant's right to counsel of choice. But if
the legal system is genuinely concerned with upholding the Sixth
Amendment's principle of autonomy, 125 we should welcome those
corrections.

2.

Adequacy of Substitute Counsel

If a trial court seeks to force substitute counsel upon an indigent
defendant after the defendant has refused appointed counsel, substi122 Id. at 208 (citing Powell, 287 U.S. 45).

123 See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017) (describing the "high bar" that a
defendant challenging counsel's performance must meet under Strickland).

124 See Ossei-Owusu, supra note 87, at 1228-30 (describing the difficult and high burden
defendants face in winning claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which "ha[s] been
and continue[s] to be particularly acute for [racial] minorities").
125 See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1507 (2018) (recognizing that the Sixth
Amendment protects defendants' "right to make ...
own defense").

fundamental choices about [their]
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tute counsel's adequacy eliminates any potential constitutional viola-

tion, thereby removing it from the sacred realm of structural error.
Whereas, for defendants with means, it makes no difference that
replacement counsel is adequate; the trial court's denial of the right to

choose is absolute. As discussed in Gonzalez-Lopez, the denial of the
126
However, for
right constitutes structural error warranting reversal.

indigent defendants, when they seek redress for the violation,
reviewing courts generally use the harder to satisfy Strickland defi127
And because courts rarely
cient performance-prejudice standard.
find adequate counsel deficient-let alone prejudice resulting from

any deficiency-an indigent defendant's alleged violation is dead on
arrival. 128 Meaning that so long as appointed counsel is adequate, indigent defendants cannot demand another lawyer, even-in most
29
In other
cases-when the relationship and representation sour.1
defendants
for
choice
of
counsel
to
right
the
holds
Court
words, the
with means in higher regard than the right to counsel of choice for

indigent defendants.
The Court made the adequacy of counsel limitation on the right
30
to counsel of choice plain in Caplin & Drysdale v. United States.1
There, the Court explained that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel of choice "guarantees defendants in criminal cases the right to

adequate representation, but those who do not have the means to hire
their own lawyers have no cognizable complaint so long as they are

adequately represented. ... "131 And yet, indigent defendants have all
sorts of valid reasons to complain about otherwise adequate

126 See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147-48.
127 This depends on the nature of the alleged violation. The court will apply Strickland if
the defendant raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for appointed counsel's

conduct, which may have prompted the defendant to unsuccessfully move for substitute
counsel. However, if the defendant raises a denial of the right to counsel-because the
court refused to substitute counsel-the reviewing court will determine if defendant had

"good cause" for substitute counsel and if the trial court abused its discretion in denying
substitute counsel. See United States v. Marrero, 651 F.3d 453, 464 (6th Cir. 2011).
128 See Ossei-Owusu, supra note 87, at 1228-30.

129 See, e.g., Shaw v. United States, 403 F.2d 528, 529 (8th Cir. 1968) (finding vague
allegation of "lack of 'rapport' [and] . .. 'communication"' between defendant and
appointed counsel insufficient to constitute ineffective representation where counsel was

otherwise "competent and skilled in the law"); Perez Goitia v. United States, 409 F.2d 524,
527 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 906 (1970) ("[L]ack of rapport between attorney
and client does not automatically mean that there has been inadequate representation.").

130 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
131 Id. at 624. At issue was whether the defendant could seek an exemption from the

forfeiture statute to pay for counsel of his choosing. The Court declined to recognize an
exemption, meaning that the defendant had no money to pay for counsel. Id. at 631.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

November 20211

BLACK ON BLACK REPRESENTATION

1517

appointed counsel, such as a breakdown in communication, 132 failure
to take a desired course of action, 133 taking a course of action over
defendant's protest, 134 and outright hostility toward the defendant. 135
Defendants' complaints about counsel usually come before a
reviewing court as ineffective assistance of counsel claims and/or as an
improper denial of defendant's request for substitute counsel. When
an indigent defendant requests substitute counsel, the trial court has a
duty to inquire about the source of defendant's dissatisfaction.1 36 If
the trial court fails to find good cause for the substitution, the indigent

defendant is stuck with appointed counsel so long as there is no conflict of interest, 137 a complete breakdown in communication, 138 or an
irreconcilable
extreme.

conflict. 13 9 Instances of these exceptions must be

However, if the defendant had means, they could simply hire a
new attorney so long as the substitution did not unduly delay the pro-

ceedings. And if the trial court prevented the defendant with means
from substituting counsel, a reviewing court would deem the error
structural, warranting reversal. This is not so for indigent defendants.
Instead, they must suffer through representation by defense counsel
with whom they are experiencing discord. And for an indigent defen132 See, e.g., United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1141-42 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming

denial of habeas relief where defendant alleged, but did not prove, "a total breakdown of
communication" with counsel due to counsel's inattention and lack of time spent on
sentencing hearing).

133 See, e.g., United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1098 (3d Cir. 1995) (affirming
denial of defendant's request for substitute counsel where counsel failed to file "a host of
motions that Goldberg insisted be filed," and trial court failed to find good cause for
substitute counsel).
134 But see McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1511 (2018) (granting new trial based on
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel where defense counsel admitted

defendant's guilt over defendant's express and repeated objections).
135 See, e.g., Osborne v. Terry, 466 F.3d 1298, 1316 (11th Cir. 2006) (denying ineffective
assistance of counsel claim as procedurally defaulted where white trial counsel referred to

Black client as a "little n[***]er [who] deserves the chair," and failed to disclose the plea
offer of life to client).
136 See Benitez v. United States, 521 F.3d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that a trial
court has an obligation to inquire into source of dissatisfaction between defendant and
counsel and may grant motion to withdraw or substitute counsel if there is a showing of

good cause).
137 See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) (establishing that a defendant must
show "an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance" to

establish Sixth Amendment violation).
138 See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 847 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding that trial court
abused its discretion by not allowing defendant's counsel to withdraw after total
breakdown in communication).
139

See Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 886 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding the Sixth

Amendment to protect against "forcing a defendant to go to trial with an attorney with

whom he has an irreconcilable conflict").
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dant, there is no justiciable remedy for discord short of Stricklandlevel ineffectiveness. Indigent defendants are stuck between a rock
and a hard place: The aspirational goals the Court articulated in
Gideon,140 and the nearly impossible-to-meet standard the Court
established in Strickland.141
Extending counsel of choice to indigent defendants could potentially dislodge them from this untenable position between Gideon's
unfulfilled promise and Strickland's effective roadblock. Had the
Court adopted Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion from Strickland,
the Court would be in a better position to extend counsel of choice to
low-income people. There, Justice Marshall suggested that if a defendant could demonstrate that counsel performed deficiently, the
reviewing court must grant them a new trial, no showing of prejudice
would be necessary. 142 Thus, defendant's mere showing that counsel
was incompetent would be enough. Again, we should welcome these
corrections. Perhaps, if the Court could no longer rely on Strickland's
difficult standard to prevent indigent defendants from regularly
receiving new trials, the Court would be more apt to extend choice to
indigent defendants. Because a denial of that right would also mean a
new trial, states would also need to be more aggressive about providing high quality counsel for indigent defendants.
3.

Parityfor Poor People

That the Court has placed indigent defendants on par with defendants with means in other areas of criminal defense casts further
doubt on why the Court draws the line at counsel of choice. Relying
on the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has held that due process

and fundamental fairness require the state to provide poor defendants
with a trial transcript if the state gives the defendant an opportunity to

appeal their case; 143 prevents the state from charging an indigent
defendant a fee to file a notice of appeal; 144 requires the state to pay

for defense counsel; 145 and requires the state to provide indigent
140 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963) (requiring states to provide
defense counsel to low-income people charged with crimes).
141 The defendant in Strickland, David Leroy Washington, an indigent Black man, did
not even obtain relief from his lawyer's failings under the legal standard Mr. Washington's
case created. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700 (1984). The state of Florida

executed Mr. Washington in 1984. Jesus Rangel, Confessed Murderer of 3 Executed in

Florida, N.Y. TIwES, July 14, 1984, at 24.
142 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 711-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (entitling petitioners to a trial
transcript).
144 See Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959) (stating that financial barriers restricting
appellate review had "no place in our heritage of [e]qual [j]ustice").
145 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-44.
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defendants with a fair opportunity to present a defense, including
funding for expert services. 146 In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court
made plain that the assistance of defense counsel in the face of criminal charges is a "necessit[y], not [a] luxur[y]."1 47 With all that is at

stake-liberty and, at times, life1 48-exercising choice in selecting
counsel should not be a privilege reserved for only those who can
afford it.
II
REPRESENTATION MATTERS

By relying on literature from other fields-clinical therapy and

education-this Part lays the foundation for Black on Black representation within indigent defense.1 49 These fields have long recognized
the unique insights and contributions people from non-dominant
racial and ethnic groups can offer, and the benefits that same-race

representation can provide racially marginalized and maligned clients
and pupils. Scholarship from these fields has examined the benefits of
racial diversity to better understand the populations they serve. As
explained more fully below, Black therapists and teachers-much like

Black public defenders-are more likely to have an awareness and an
understanding of the social meaning assigned to Black people and can
use that embodied empathy to the advantage of their same-race clients and pupils. Research shows that their very presence can put clients and pupils at ease, ultimately improving Black patient utilization

of counseling services1 50 and Black student performance.151
See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-81 (1985) (requiring that the State provide a
competent psychiatrist where the defendant's psychiatric state is a significant factor at
146

trial).
147 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.

148 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) ("Assistance of [c]ounsel ...

is one of

the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human

rights of life and liberty.").
149 CLAIR, supra note 13, at 76 ("[T]he attorney-client relationship is quite similar to
many other professional-client relationships, such as that between a doctor and patient or a
teacher and student. These relationships often require trust if they are to function to the

benefit of clients.").
150 See, e.g., Darryl L. Townes, Shannon Chavez-Korell & Nancy J. Cunningham,
Reexamining the Relationships Between Racial Identity, Cultural Mistrust, Help-Seeking
Attitudes, and Preferencefor a Black Counselor, 56 J. COUNSELING PsycH. 330, 331 (2009)

(noting that some studies suggest Black patients do not utilize mental health resources in
part because of distrust towards white counselors).
151 See, e.g., Anna J. Egalite, Brian Kisida & Marcus A. Winters, Representation in the
Classroom: The Effect of Own-Race Teachers on Student Achievement, 45 EcON. EDUC.
REV. 44 (2015); Thomas S. Dee, Teachers, Race, and Student Achievement in a Randomized
Experiment, 86 REv. ECoNS. & STATS. 195 (2004).
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That these conversations are not already occurring in legal schol-

arship about indigent defense is problematic, particularly given the
demographics of the client and attorney populations. 15 2 However, this
Article can begin the conversation and spur additional research recog-

nizing that Black public defenders may help better serve Black people
facing criminal charges and more effectively challenge anti-Black bias
in the criminal legal system.

A.

Someone Who Understands:Black Therapistsfor Black Patients

Research on the relationship between Black patients and therapists offers valuable insight into the dynamics that can exist between

a Black person charged with a crime and appointed counsel. The
clinical therapy community has widely accepted that in order to
improve mental health services for people of color, patients should be
matched with same-race counselors when possible. 15 3 Research shows
that Black therapists are able to provide more culturally congruent

treatment given "their more nuanced understanding of Black communities" 154 and that Black therapists are more likely to feel personally
invested in their Black patients. 155 Most relevant for our purposes,
research shows that white counselors, relative to Black counselors,
56
have a harder time obtaining their Black patients' trust.1 In a study
examining Black therapists who work with Black families, researchers

found that Black patients experience "positive outcomes when [their]
152 Sociologists Matthew Clair's and Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve's books on indigent
defense, racism, and inequality in criminal courts are notable exceptions. Each contains
extensive qualitative research. See CLAIR, supra note 13 (describing Boston's criminal
courts); GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 20 (examining Chicago's criminal courts).
153 See, e.g., Raquel R. Cabral & Timothy B. Smith, Racial/Ethnic Matching of Clients
and Therapists in Mental Health Services: A Meta-Analytic Review of Preferences,
Perceptions, and Outcomes, 58 J. COUNSELING PSYCH. 537, 537 (2011) (noting that there

was a decades-old presumption that clients should be matched with a therapist of the same
race

or ethnicity

for better

therapeutic

care);

HANDBOOK

OF MULTICULTURAL

Hardin L.K.
Coleman, William Ming Liu & Rebecca L. Toporek eds., 2003) (containing chapters
addressing the practice of multicultural competency in counseling).
COMPETENCIES IN COUNSELING AND PSYCHOLOGY (Donald B. Pope-Davis,

154 David T. Goode-Cross & Karen Ann Grim, "An Unspoken Level of Comfort": Black
Therapists' Experiences Working with Black Clients, 42 J. BLACK PSYCH. 29, 30 (2016)
(citation omitted).
155 David T. Goode-Cross & Suzette L. Speight, But Some of the Therapists Are Black
(describing shared dynamics related to being Black that increase Black therapists'
identification with and investment in Black patients), in HANDBOOK OF RACE-ETHNICITY
AND GENDER IN PSYCHOLOGY 329, 331 (M.L. Miville & A.D. Ferguson eds., 2014).
156 See C. Edward Watkins, Jr., Francis Terrell, Fayneese S. Miller & Sandra L. Terrell,
Cultural Mistrust and Its Effects on Expectational Variables in Black Client-White
Counselor Relationships, 36 J. COUNSELING PSYCH. 447, 448-49 (1989).
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therapists have an understanding of the history or experiences African
Americans have had to endure."1 57

There are multiple parallels worth noting between clinical
therapy and indigent defense. Relative to white patients, Black
patients' entry into mental healthcare counseling is more likely to
exist under emergency circumstances and/or "under coerced or man-

dated conditions rather than" being voluntary or self-referred.1 58 This
parallels Black people's entry into the criminal legal system in which
individuals experience a highly stressful event (often an arrest followed by criminal charges) and the court often appoints defense

counsel, rather than the individual electively retaining counsel. Like
the overrepresentation of Black people in the criminal legal system,

Black people are overrepresented in populations with mental healthcare needs,1 59 but disproportionately underrepresented in the mental
healthcare profession. Only 6.4% of social workers are Black, slightly
less than 4% of counseling professionals are Black, less than 2% of
doctoral-level psychologists self-identify as Black, and there are even

fewer Black psychiatrists.160 Akin to the way white public defenders'
anti-Black racial bias can negatively impact representation of Black

defendants, research suggests that white counselors' racial biases and
stereotypes may account for mental healthcare disparities in Black
patients, including spending less time with Black patients, giving more
severe diagnoses to Black patients relative to identically presenting
white patients, and overmedicating Black patients.161
The robust research on the experiences of Black patients in
therapy has helped improve counseling for Black patients. The
research shows that Black patients with strong ethnic and cultural ties
to their race derive the greatest therapeutic benefits when they
receive "culturally congruent mental health services."1 62 However, the
157 LaVerne Bell-Tolliver, Ruby Burgess & Linda J. Brock, African American Therapists
Working with African American Families:An Exploration of the Strengths Perspective in
Treatment, 35 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY 293, 304 (2009).
158 Townes et al., supra note 150, at 331 (citation omitted).
159 See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: CULTURE,
RACE & ETHNICrrY-A SUPPLEMENT TO MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL 1, 61, 68 (2001) [hereinafter HHS MENTAL HEALTH], https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.

gov/books/NBK44243 (finding that African Americans are overrepresented in high-need
populations, have less access to mental healthcare services, and are less likely to receive
treatment for their mental healthcare needs).
160 Townes et al., supra note 150, at 330 (citation omitted).
161 See Arthur L. Whaley, Racism in the Provision of Mental Health Services: A SocialCognitive Analysis, 68 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 47, 51 (1998); HHS MENTAL HEALTH,
supra note 159, at 66-67 (explaining that clinician bias may contribute to inaccurate mental

health diagnoses for Black patients).
162 Cabral & Smith, supra note 153, at 546.
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availability of Black therapists cannot meet the demand. As early as

2001, the Surgeon General recognized that "[t]he supply of African
American clinicians is important," in part because Black patients tend

to underutilize services given "[f]eelings of mistrust and stigma or perceptions of racism or discrimination."1 6 3 Like in the legal profession,
there remains a dearth of Black therapists. Unlike the law, clinical

therapy has responded by embracing the need for all therapists who
work with patients of color, particularly Black patients, "to apply multicultural competencies" to improve patient utilization, retention, and
outcomes.164 To this end, the clinical therapy community has been

producing robust scholarship, training, and assessment on multicultural counseling competency for decades.1 65
B.

A Teacher Who Looks Like Me

The unfortunate parallels between the public-school system and

the criminal legal system abound, particularly given the welldocumented funneling of Black and brown children from the former
to the latter.16 6 This has become increasingly true for Black girls.1 6 7

However, this Article leaves the discussion of the school-to-prison
pipeline to others. Instead, this Section will explore the impact of
same-race teachers on student performance and use it as a reference
point for examining same-race representation in the criminal legal

system. Policymakers, educators, and researchers have long discussed
the benefits same-race teachers can have on students, particularly
Black students.168 In 2010, relying on this association, the U.S.
163 HHS MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 159, at 63, 68.
164

Cabral & Smith, supra note 153, at 546 (citing Derald Wing Sue, Patricia Arredondo

& Roderick J. McDavis, Multicultural Counseling Competencies and Standards: A Call to
the Profession, 70 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 477 (1992)).
165 See, e.g., Charles R. Ridley & Amy J. Kleiner, Multicultural Counseling Competence:
History,

Themes,

and Issues, in HANDBOOK

OF MULTICULTURAL

COMPETENCIES IN

COUNSELING & PSYCHOLOGY 3 (Donald B. Pope-Davis, Hardin L.K. Coleman, William

Ming Liu & Rebecca L. Toporek eds., 2003).
166 See, e.g., AJMEL QUERESHI & JASON OKONOFUA, LOCKED OUT OF THE CLASSROOM:
How IMPLICrr BIAS CONTRIBUTES TO DISPARITIES IN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE (2017); CARA
MCCLELLAN, OUR GmLS, OUR FUTURE: INVESTING IN OPPORTUNITY & REDUCING
RELIANCE ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN BALTIMORE (2018).

167 See MCCLELLAN, supra note 166, at 1 ("Black girls are the fastest growing

demographic affected by school discipline, arrests, and referrals to the juvenile justice
system.").
168 See, e.g., Seth Gershenson, Cassandra M. D. Hart, Constance A. Lindsay & Nicholas
W. Papageorge, The Long-Run Impacts of Same-Race Teachers (IZA Inst. Lab. Econ.,

Discussion Paper No. 10630, 2017), https://ftp.iza.org/dp10630.pdf (finding that race
matching in a Black child's primary school years "significantly reduces" the chance that
they will drop out of high school, "particularly among the most economically
disadvantaged [B]lack males"); Egalite et al., supra note 151, at 50 (finding that lower
performing Black and white students experience the greatest benefit from being assigned
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Department of Education launched a national teacher recruitment
campaign, calling specifically for more minority males and acknowl-

edging that "more than 35 percent of public school students are
[B]lack or Hispanic, but less than 15 percent of teachers are Black or
Latino. Less than two percent of our nation's teachers are AfricanAmerican males." 169
Before parsing this literature, there are a few notable similarities

between the public education and public defense systems worthy of
discussion. Like in the criminal legal system, there is an overrepresentation and concentration of Black people in many public schools relative to the population in the community. These demographic trends
are especially true in cities that experienced white flight to suburban
communities and private schools after court-ordered school desegre-

gation. 170 Like with indigent defense counsel, there is an underrepresentation of teachers of color, particularly

Black teachers,

relative to the populations served in public schools.1 7 1 Again, like the
negative impact public defenders' anti-Black bias has on their Black
clients, teachers' anti-Black bias contributes to Black children being
suspended and expelled at higher rates than their non-Black classmates; 172 research shows these disparities begin as early as pre-

same-race teachers); Dee, supra note 151, at 195 (noting that it was "conventional wisdom
among educators" that minority students performed better academically when taught by
minority teachers).

169 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., US Dep't of Educ. Launches Nat'l Teacher
Recruitment Campaign (Sept. 27, 2010), https://www.legistorm.com/stormfeed/view_rss/
68444/organization/69539/title/us-department-of-education-launches-national-teacherrecruitment-campaign.html.
170 See, e.g., Brad Bennett, Weekend Read: 66 Years After Brown v. Board, Schools
Across the South Still Separate and Unequal, S. POVERTY L. CTR., (May 16, 2020), https://
www.splcenter.org/news/2020/05/16/weekend-read-66-years-after-brown-v-board-schoolsacross-south-still-separate-and-unequal ("After the Brown decision, many Southern states

established publicly funded private school voucher schemes to get around court-ordered
integration. Today, voucher programs persist .... "); EDBUILD, $23 BILLION, at 2 (2019)
(noting that the "place-based racial divide ... in America" results in "students attending
racially concentrated school districts" where half are enrolled in districts that are more
than "75% nonwhite" and the other half are enrolled in "75% white" districts).
171 See Egalite et al., supra note 151, at 44; see also Madeline Will, 65 Years After
'Brown v. Board,' Where Are All the Black Educators?, EDUC. WEEK (May 14, 2019),
https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2019/05/14/65-years-after-brown-v-board-where.html

("Today, many scholars say the persistent lack of [B]lack teachers in the profession can be
traced to the aftermath of the Brown decision. 'We decimated the [B]lack principal and
teacher pipeline, and we've never rectified that."' (quoting Leslie Fenwick, a professor at

Howard University School of Education)).
172 See,

e.g., U.S. GoV'T

ACCOUNTABILITY

OFF., GAO-18-258, K-12 EDUCATION

DISCIPLINE DISPARITIES FOR BLACK STUDENTS, BOYS, AND STUDENTS wITH DISABILITIES

1, 4 (2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690828.pdf.
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school. 173 This can result in distrust of the very individuals whom the

student should be able to rely upon for guidance and support.
Given these troubling observations, it is no surprise that students
of color, particularly Black students, can benefit from receiving

17 4
These benefits
instruction from teachers who share their race.

include improved attendance, academic achievement, less frequent
suspension and expulsion (likely reflecting Black teachers' different

treatment and different interpretation of behavior), and increased
175
Most researchers explain the
chance of obtaining higher education.
positive impact that same-race teachers can have on Black students in
one of two ways: passive or active. 176 Passive teacher effect means that
the student derives a benefit from the teacher's mere same-race pres177
ence, potentially viewing the teacher as a model for success.
Researchers also note that passive teacher effect can help mitigate

stereotype threat-the situational predicament where an individual
17 8 In
fears confirming a negative stereotype about their social group.
educational settings, stereotype threat can result in a Black student's
lower academic performance in the face of a teacher's lowered expec-

tations. 179 Conversely, active teacher effect refers to proactive conduct
on the teacher's part, such as spending more time interacting with stu-

dents of their same race, or in designing more culturally relevant (and
180
thus, potentially more engaging and relevant) course materials.
These descriptive observations of same-race teachers' impact on
Black students provide helpful insight into the dynamics between a

Black defender and indigent defendant. Borrowing the active/passive
effect framework allows us to form opinions on why and how the rela-

tionship can be beneficial. With regard to the active effect, a same173 Walter S. Gilliam, Angela N. Maupin, Chin R. Reyes, Maria Accavitti & Frederick
Shic, Do Early Educators' Implicit Biases Regarding Sex and Race Relate to Behavior
Expectations and Recommendations of Preschool Expulsion and Suspensions? A Research

Study Brief,
174

YALE CHILD STUDY

See, e.g., U.S.

DEP'T OF

CTR. 1, 2 (2016).
EDUC.,

THE

STATE

OF RACIAL

DIVERSITY

IN THE

1, 2 (2016).
175 Gershenson et al., supra note 168, at 19 ("Exposure to at least one [B]lack teacher in
grades 3-5 also increases the likelihood that persistently low-income students of both sexes
aspire to attend a four-year college.").
EDUCATOR WORKFORCE

176 See, e.g., Egalite et al., supra note 151, at 45, 51; Dee, supra note 151, at 196-97;
Thomas S. Dee, A Teacher Like Me: Does Race, Ethnicity, or Gender Matter?, 95 AM.
ECON. REV. 158, 159 (2005).
177 Dee, supra note 176, at 159.
178 See id. at 159, 164; see also Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes
Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PsYcH. 613 (1997); Claude M. Steele
& Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African
Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYcH. 797, 797 (1995).

179 See Dee, supra note 176, at 159 (citation omitted).
180 See id. at 197.
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race defender may be more likely to feel personally invested in a
Black client's case, and as a result, spend more time with the client
and on the case, or be more aware of challenging race-based issues
that occur in the client's case than a different-race defender. The find-

ings in Parts III and IV support these hypothetical scenarios, as does
existing research examining the opposite trend: Public defenders who
harbor anti-Black bias can have a detrimental impact on their clients'
cases because they tend to spend less time on these cases and fail to

raise potentially meritorious issues. 18 1 With regard to the passive
effect, as discussed in Section IV.B, a Black lawyer's mere physical
presence in court proceedings may mitigate stereotypes of criminality
and culpability that judges, jurors, and prosecutors subconsciously
apply to Black defendants who come before them. 8 2 As described in
Part IV, Black lawyers may also more readily engender trust in their

clients, enabling their clients to disclose facts and information in support of the defense that the clients may otherwise avoid or be more

hesitant to disclose to non-racially congruent counsel. Thus, the
active/passive framework provides a helpful lens through which to
measure and test the impact of racially congruent representation.

III
EMBODIED EMPATHY

In this Part, I define "embodied empathy"-the unspoken familiarity between Black people given their shared experience with the
social meaning assigned to Black people in this country. While I identify a shared experience among Black people in this country, I also
recognize that same-race representation has limitations given the multitude of differences among Black people and that some Black defendants may not want a Black lawyer. 183
Differences in class, gender, country of origin, and other coexistent identities can have varying degrees of impact on the way Black
people experience their race and ethnicity in this country.184
American-born Black people who can trace their ancestry to slavery
181 Richardson & Goff, supra note 22, at 2641 (explaining that anti-Black implicit bias
may result in defenders spending less "time, effort, and scarce resources" on cases with

"stereotypically '[B]lack' feature[d]" clients).
182

See, e.g., Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward a CriticalRace Theory of Evidence, 101

MrNN. L. REv. 2243, 2261-68 (2017) (explaining that jurors often consider and rely upon
racial character evidence-essentially the race of the parties and witnesses-when deciding

civil or criminal liability and witness credibility, even though the parties rarely introduce
such evidence and the court does not subject it to evidentiary scrutiny).
183 See infra Section IV.C.
184

See

DELGADO

&

STEFANCIC,

supra note 26, at 63-66 (discussing essentialism and

antiessentialism).
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in America 18 5 may experience their race differently than Black people
who recently immigrated from one of over fifty countries in Africa,
Latin America, the Caribbean, or elsewhere in the world. 186 In turn,

first-generation Black people may have different experiences than
both American-born descendants of enslaved people and recent immigrants.1 87 Black people who are racially mixed may have an altogether
different experience than any of the previously identified
subgroups.1 88
Each of these differences can impact the experience and identity
formation of a Black person, which in turn, can factor into how they
relate to another Black person within the attorney-client relationship
context. These differences make clear that Black people and experiences are not monolithic; nevertheless, there is a unifying Black
experience in this country given the institution of slavery and the
racial hierarchy that resulted-a hierarchy that is woven into the
nation's social fabric and impacts all who reside here. 189 This shared
185 See Farah Stockman, 'We're Self-Interested': The Growing Identity Debate in Black
America, N.Y. TImEs (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/08/us/slavery-blackimmigrants-ados.html (describing differences between Black American descendants of
slavery, Black immigrants from Africa and the Caribbean, and that a small emerging

group, American Descendants of Slavery (ADOS) "who embrace its philosophy point to
disparities between [B]lack people who immigrated to the United States voluntarily, and
others whose ancestors were brought in chains").
186 See Monica Anderson, A Rising Share of the U.S. Black Population Is Foreign Born,
PEw RscH. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/04/09/a-rising-share-

of-the-u-s-black-population-is-foreign-born (explaining that the Black immigrant
population in the U.S. has quadrupled since 1980 and that foreign-born Black people are
more likely to have a college degree, less likely to live in poverty, on average, have higher
average incomes, and are more likely to be married than American-born Black people).
187 See Being Black in America and Being African Aren't Mutually Exclusive, NPR: ALL
THINGS CONSIDERED (Feb. 11, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/02/11/514732232/being-

(describing potential
black-in-america-and-being-african-arent-mutually-exclusive
challenges in identity formation American children born to African immigrants experience
as they navigate African and Black American identities).
188 See Arnold K. Ho, Nour Kteily & J.M. Chen, How Are Black-White BiracialPeople
Perceived in Terms of Race?, KELLOGG INSIGHT (Dec. 6, 2017), https://
insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/how-are-black-white-biracial-people-are-

perceived-in-terms-of-race (examining how Black and white people view Black-white
biracial people, finding that both groups viewed them as slightly more Black); Jasmine
Norman, The Racial Identities MultiracialPeople Adopt May Depend on How Others Treat
Them, SOc'Y FOR PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCH. (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.spsp.org/news-

center/blog/norman-multiracial-people-identities (finding "that other peoples' comments
and questions about appearance, as well as perceived discrimination from certain racial
groups, relate to how strongly mixed-race people identify as multiracial").
189 See WILKERSON, supra note 32, at 33 (explaining that after "African captives [were]
transported to build the New World and to serve the victors, .... [t]here developed a caste

system, based upon what people looked like, an internalized ranking, unspoken, unnamed,
unacknowledged by everyday citizens even as they go about their lives adhering to it and
acting upon it subconsciously to this day").
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understanding-or embodied empathy-in the legal context may help
establish trust and improve communication between Black indigent
defendants and their lawyers, and may give Black public defenders

opportunities to mitigate anti-Black bias their clients face within the
criminal legal system.
A.

I See You. I Hear You. I Understand.

Eye contact and the subtle lift or dip of the chin, exchanged from
across a crowded room, or while walking past one another. It is the
universal gesture among Black people, signaling recognition, communicating: I see you; I hear you; I understand. I too experience the social
meaning assigned to Black people. Without uttering a word, this
simple gesture can offer greeting, reassurance, validation, and affirmation. It communicates empathy. Among and between Black people, I
call this exchange "embodied empathy." Although the term embodied

empathy exists in psychotherapy, 190 I use it here to mean the shared
knowledge of experiencing this country as a Black person.

This nation, built upon the backs of enslaved Black people, is still
stained with slavery's legacy. Many of this nation's institutions are
direct descendants of slavery: our system of capitalism, 19 1 the organi-

zation of our communities, 192 our education system, 193 and our criminal legal

Hannah-Jones explained in her

See Ilaria Minio-Paluello, Simon Baron-Cohen, Alessio Avenanti, Vincent Walsh

&

190

system. 194 As Nikole

Salvatore M. Aglioti, Absence of Embodied Empathy During Pain Observation in Asperger
Syndrome, BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 55, 55, 59-60 (2009) (finding that people with

Asperger Syndrome (AS), often defined by "reduced empathic abilities," have difficulty
registering pain that they observe in others, and thus concluding that people with AS

lacked "embodied empathic reactivity to the sensations experienced by another person").
191

See

JOSHUA

D.

ROTHMAN,

FLUSH

TIMES AND

FEVER DREAMS:

A

STORY OF

CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF JACKSON (2012) (detailing America's culture of

speculation that drove up cotton production, resulting in the Panic of 1837 and eventually
the Civil War, and which would eventually become a defining characteristic of American
capitalism).
192 See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF How
OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017) (describing local, state, and federal

laws that established and promoted racially segregated housing, beginning in the 1920s, as
millions of Black people fled racial terrorism in the South and encountered racial
subordination in the North, a direct holdover from slavery).
193 See, e.g., Robert L. Reece & Heather A. O'Connell, How the Legacy of Slavery and
Racial Composition Shape Public School Enrollment in the American South, 2 SoCio.

RACE & ETHNICr=Y 42, 42 (2016) (arguing that the legacy of slavery shaped Southern local
social structures in ways that resulted in white disinvestment from public schools, white
&

attendance at private schools, and racially resegregated public schools); Stephen Smith
Kate Ellis, Shackled Legacy: History Shows Slavery Helped Build Many U.S. Colleges and
Universities, AM. PUB. MEDIA REPS. (Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.apmreports.org/episode/

2017/09/04/shackled-legacy.
194 See supra note 30.
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opening essay of The 1619 Project, "Anti-[B]lack racism [derived from
slavery] runs in the very DNA of this country." 195 In Policing the

Black Man, Bryan Stevenson describes "a narrative of racial difference that contaminates the thinking of most Americans. We are burdened by our history of racial injustice in ways that shape [how] we
think, act, and enforce the law."1 96 Thus, to exist as a Black person in

this nation can be a uniquely unifying experience. To better understand this shared experience among Black people that can convey
empathy based on this shared understanding, I turn to two contemporary authors who write about navigating America while Black.
In Heavy: An American Memoir, Kiese Laymon charts the pain,

joy, and danger of growing up in Jackson, Mississippi as a Black
197
His
person, and later, as a professor in upstate New York.
Blackness is never not relevant, and the precariousness of his safety is
most acute relative to white people. Fresh from high school basketball
practice, Laymon and his teammates, also Black, congregate at the
local Red Lobster to watch a game. 198 The news interrupts with

footage of a group of white police officers watching another group of
white police officers beat a Black man.
We watched the news replay the video four times. We all had cops

rough us up, chase us, pull guns on us, call us out of our names. We
all watched cops shame our mamas, aunties, and grandmamas. We
all floated down I-55 creating lyrical force fields from the police and

everything the police protected and served, rapping, "A young
n[***]a got it bad 'cause I'm brown." But here we were, in one of
our safe spaces, watching white folk watch white police watch other

white police destroy our body.1 99
In that moment, Laymon and his friends are reminded that their
Blackness renders them vulnerable. Laymon's white girlfriend then

arrives to pick him up, ignorant to the local news.200 He is tense and
different, failing to give her the greeting to which she is accustomed. 201 She senses something is off, but Laymon refuses to elaborate and she drops him at home, angry about what she does not know,
195 Nikole Hannah-Jones, Our Democracy's Founding Ideals Were False when They
Were Written. Black Americans Have Foughtto Make Them True., N.Y. TIMEs MAG. (Aug.
14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/black-historyamerican-democracy.html.
196 Bryan Stevenson, A Presumptionof Guilt: The Legacy of America's History of Racial
Injustice, in POLICING THE BLACK MAN 3, 5 (Angela J. Davis ed., 2017).
197 KIESE

LAYMON,

HEAVY: AN AMERICAN MEMOIR

(2018).

198 Id. at 95.
199 Id.
200 Id.

201 See id. at 95-96.
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what he cannot explain, and what she cannot understand. 202 Although

Laymon could tell the girl with whom he is intimate, the girl he says
he loves, what transpired and where his head is at, something stops
him.20 3 To do so, he would have to explain too much, expend too
much effort, and expose himself. Worse, her response might come

from a place of pity instead of understanding. Laymon's girlfriend
lacks an experiential awareness of being Black.

Ta-Nehisi Coates writes about the uniqueness of existing in the
world-specifically America-as a Black man in Between the World
and Me. In the book, a longform letter to his fifteen-year-old son,
Coates considers American-made racism and the violence and constraints it renders upon Black people. He muses: "[H]ow do I live free

in this [B]lack body?" 20 4 After identifying a string of unarmed Black
men and boys killed by police officers, Coates warns his son:
The destroyers will rarely be held accountable. Mostly they will

receive pensions. And destruction is merely the superlative form of
a dominion whose prerogatives include friskings, detainings, beatings, and humiliations. All of this is common to [B]lack people. And
all of this is old for [B]lack people. No one is held responsible. 20 5

Although "the destroyers" are law enforcement, the law routinely
fails to hold them legally accountable for their misconduct toward
Black people, even when lethal. 206 In the book's opening pages,
Coates observes his son quietly retreat to his bedroom, crying at the
news report that Michael Brown's killers will not be held accountable
for their actions. 207 To dull any future pain his son will experience
when another unarmed Black person is killed at the hands of police,
Coates explains that such occurrences are ordinary, expected even. To
be Black is to know that such things predictably reoccur. This is the
lesson Coates must teach his son in America. 2 08 As Bryan Stevenson
explains: "People of color in the United States, particularly young
[B]lack men, are burdened with a presumption of guilt and
dangerousness." 20 9
202 Id. at 96.
203 Id.
204 TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 12 (2015).

&

205 Id. at 9.
206 Id. at 11; see Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson
Police
Officer Is Not Indicted, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/
us/ferguson-darren-wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html; Matt Apuzzo
Michael S. Schmidt, U.S. Not Expected to Fault Officer in Ferguson Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/22/us/justice-department-ferguson-civil-rights-

darren-wilson.html.
207 COATES, supra note 204, at 11.
See also IMANI PERRY, BREATHE: A LETTER TO MY SONS (2019).
209 Stevenson, supra note 196, at 4.
208
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Embodied empathy is born from the shared experience of navigating the social meanings attached to Black people in America. The
joys, the indignities, the celebrations, and the violence. It is intimate,
lived familiarity with experiencing America's racial hierarchy that
formed during slavery, the impact of which is felt by Black people
regardless of whether one's ancestors were held in bondage or immigrated voluntarily. Within the context of clinical therapy, Black "therapists often see themselves as being culturally connected to their

[Black] clients, and having a shared cultural heritage and history can
lead to a unique therapeutic alliance between [Black] therapists and
[Black] clients." 210
This understanding and lived experience can add a greater and
necessary

depth to the attorney-client

relationship.

One Black

defender described her exposure to certain life experiences as enabling her to form deeper connections with Black clients: "Being a
child of parents who were incarcerated; ... [I'll share] whatever I have
2 11
Doing so communicates to her clients
to pull from my background."
that she understands, or at least has the ability to understand, what

they are experiencing. And like in clinical therapy, this knowledge and
experience can benefit Black defendants by engendering greater
embodied empathy on the part of same-race defenders.
B.

Extending the Right

What if the law empowered indigent defendants to choose
counsel who they believed could best represent them? Some federal
appellate courts have concluded that the right to counsel "would be
without substance if it did not include the right to a meaningful
attorney-client relationship. "212
For many defendants, quality representation includes how well
counsel hears, believes, and understands them; and how well counsel
tells their story. 213 Whether counsel is competent and has the capacity

to provide adequate representation-factors trial courts consider
when defendants request to substitute counsel-misses the mark. Further, the Court frames these factors as a negative-the floor that
counsel should not fall below. Instead, a defendant may prioritize pos-

itive factors, such as a lawyer with the ability to overcome the pre210 Goode-Cross & Speight, supra note 155, at 331 (citation omitted).
211 Defender No. 9.

212 Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 1, 13 (1983).
213 See Chelsea Davis, Ayesha Delany-Brumsey & Jim Parsons, 'A Little

on the
Communication Would Have Been Nice, Since This Is My Life': Defendant Views
client
of
study
a
(describing
(2016)
29-31
28,
CHAMPION
40
Relationship,
Attorney-Client
interviews which reveals how important communication is to attorney-client relationships).
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sumption of dangerousness and criminality that society and the legal
system assign Black defendants. In fact, "[o]ur system of laws gener-

ally presumes that the criminal defendant . . . knows his own best
interests and does not need them dictated by the State." 2 14
These ideas are not unprecedented. In a 2008 article, Shani King
advocated for Black lawyers to represent Black clients in civil legal

service cases. 2 15 King recommended that "[g]iven the fundamental
importance of the attorney-client relationship in securing favorable
outcomes for clients, legal services organizations . . . that serve large
populations of African American clients should employ staff attorneys
who are most likely to engender trust and facilitate communication
with their clients.... [That is,] African American staff attorneys." 2 16

Two decades after Stephen Schulhofer and David Friedman recognized that extending the right would likely improve the attorney-client
relationship, 2 17 their arguments led a small community in Texas to

enable indigent defendants to select counsel of their choosing among
a list of court approved lawyers. 2 18 The one-year pilot program, the
first of its kind in the nation, appeared to work. 219 Relative to nonchoice defendants, client choice defendants were more likely to perceive that their lawyer treated them with respect.2 20 With regard to

outcomes, although most cases involved the defendant pleading guilty,
significantly more choice defendants pled to lesser charges, more
choice defendants went to trial than non-choice, and choice defen-

214 Martinez v. Ct. of Appeals of California, Fourth App. Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 165 (2000)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
215 Shani M. King, Race, Identity, and Professional Responsibility: Why Legal Services
OrganizationsNeed African American Staff Attorneys, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1

(2008).
216 Id. at 3-4.
217 Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 41, at 104.

218 Schulhofer, supra note 41, at 544-57 (describing Comal County, Texas's pilot
program implementing counsel of choice for indigent defendants); see also Catherine
Burnett, Choosing Choice: Empowering Indigent Criminal Defendants to Select Their

Counsel, 60

S. TEX. L. REv. 277, 310-24 (2019) (same).

219 The program's small sample size limits meaningful extrapolation. Burnett, supra note

218, at 321.
220 M. ELAINE NUGENT-BORAKOVE,

FRANKLIN CRUZ & NORMAN LEFSTEIN, JUST.

MGMT. INST., THE POWER OF CHOICE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF A SYSTEM WHERE INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS CHOOSE THEIR OwN COUNSEL 34 (2017), https://www.jmijustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/The-Power-of-Choice_29-MAR-2017.pdf.
The program's
evaluation did not consider race when analyzing the attorney-client relationship. Comal
County, Texas is approximately 67% white (alone, not Hispanic), 28% Hispanic, and less
than 3% Black. QuickFacts: Comal County, Texas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2019), https://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/comalcountytexas.
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dants were more likely to receive a sentence of community service
221
rather than incarceration.

These benefits to the outcomes of choice defendants' cases
demonstrate that there may be something more at stake than merely
exercising agency, which by itself is still a worthy priority. These bene-

fits suggest that when a defendant is able to exercise choice, it fosters
trust; and with trust comes an improved attorney-client relationship,
which can offer multiple benefits, including better case outcomes. As
discussed below, enabling choice-driven racial congruency between
the defendant and counsel can also facilitate trust. And given the
racialized criminal legal system, trust within same-race representation
may provide significant improvements to the outcomes of Black indi-

gent defendants' cases.
IV
BLACK ON BLACK REPRESENTATION

Should the law extend counsel of choice to indigent defendants, it

would enable low-income people charged with a crime the autonomy

2 22
to select the lawyer that they believe would best represent them.

This Part explores why a Black indigent defendant might prioritize
racial congruency and cultural competency when selecting representation. The desire to match Black defendants with Black advocates for
improved representation is not a new concept. In the 1960s, the sentiment in under-resourced communities of color was that "there was
something unseemly about large numbers of [B]lack defendants being
appointed [white] lawyers who seemed to have little understanding of

their lives." 223 In 1978, Judge John D. Fauntleroy, one of Washington,
D.C.'s first Black judges, chastised the esteemed Public Defender
Service for its failure to hire Black lawyers: "When you're dealing
with these community problems (in Superior Court) you need people
224
who understand the community."

As discussed in Part III, Black public defenders may be better
situated to represent their client's humanity before the court given
their shared understanding of the social meanings attached to Black
people in this country. Research demonstrates that Black public
221 Burnett, supra note 218, at 317-18 (citing NUGENT-BORAKOVE ET AL., supra note
220, at 32-33).
222 See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006) (finding that the right
to counsel of choice "commands .. . that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided-to
wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be best").
223 MAYEUX, supra note 53, at 160.
224 Laura A. Kiernan, Public Defender Unit Accused of Bias, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1978,
at C3.
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defenders harbor less anti-Black bias than do their non-Black colleagues. 225 Black public defenders, more often than their white colleagues, have direct or indirect exposure to communities similar to
those their clients are from and exposure to similar life experiences. 226
In a criminal justice policy recommendation to the Biden
Administration, the Black Public Defender Association explained that
Black public defenders who "come from communities most disproportionately impacted by the criminal legal system" are "necessary to

fight against racism and end mass incarceration." 22 7 Sameness,
whether stemming from race, sexuality, or some other shared identity,

can inspire connection, often helping people "establish rapport, trust,
and engagement." 228
This Part presents firsthand accounts from Black public defenders
about how they perceived their shared race with their clients-given
the social meanings assigned to race-impacted the formation of the
attorney-client relationship, improved representation, and mitigated

anti-Black bias. As demonstrated below, same-race representation
may lead to more thorough investigation, more robust case theory

development, and better development and presentation of mitigating
225

See Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 22, at 1553 (finding that, among capital defense

attorneys who underwent implicit association testing, "[B]lack subjects ha[d] an automatic
preference for [B]lack [faces], but [the effect was] significantly smaller than the preference

white and Asian subjects have for white [faces]"); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair
Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of "Affirmative Action," 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063,
1072 (2006) (noting that anti-Black bias is significantly higher for white people than for
Black people).
226 See Defender No. 5 ("Unfortunately, for a lot of our [non-Black] lawyers, the only
experience they have with Black people is as clients."); id. ("I'm from the same
neighborhood as my clients. When they mention a place, I know exactly what they're
talking about. When they slip into some slang from the Southside, I know what they
mean."); Defender No. 10 ("I know ... what that experience is like. I've . . . had cousins

who [were] arrested and their moms is calling me to help, or family members of my own.
And I know ... what's going through ... [my clients'] heads and particularly when I reach
out to [their] family members. I'm aware."); Defender No. 9 ("When your client knows
that you understand what it's like to visit a loved one, a parent, a sibling in custody, in lock

up. To be patted down, searched. To write letters. To put money on someone's books. To
accept a collect phone call. When [your client] knows that you've been there, that you have
a shared experience with them, you can't put a value on that."); see also CLAIR, supra note

13, at 74 ("[R]acially marginalized defendants have the .. . disadvantage of being less likely
to share everyday cultural experiences with their defense attorneys, who are mostly white
and middle class. Sharing cultural experiences, tastes, or worldviews . . . tends to facilitate
trust, whereas not sharing these qualities ... tends to be grounds for mistrust." (footnotes

omitted)).
227 BLACK

PUB.

RECOMMENDATIONS

DEF.
TO

Ass'N,
THE

DISRUPTING

BIDEN-HARRIS

CARCERAL

SYSTEMS:

ADMINISTRATION

BPDA's

3 (2021), http://

blackdefender.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/bpda-biden-harris-report.pdf.
228 Alexis Anderson, Lynn Barenberg & Carwina Weng, Challenges of "Sameness":
Pitfalls and Benefits to Assumed Connections in Lawyering, 18 CLINICAL L. REv. 339,
340-41 (2012).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

1534

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1493

evidence at sentencing. These factors are critical to effective representation under the Sixth Amendment.
A.

The Attorney-Client Relationship

The initial meeting is a critical moment in the formation of the

attorney-client relationship that can set the stage for the remainder of
representation. This meeting is often brief, stressful, and transactional
given counsel's immediate need to obtain information about the case
against the client. However, it is critical for defense counsel to lay the
foundation for an effective attorney-client relationship during this first
interaction. 229 When a Black defendant is paired with a non-Black
defense lawyer, it is necessary to first break through a cross-racial barrier to develop the relationship. 2 30 By contrast, a same-race defender

can immediately begin to establish a deeper professional connection.231 The head of one public defender office explained that when
she establishes an initial bond with a same-race client, they can jump
right into discussing the substance of the case 232
For some Black defendants, simply laying eyes on a Black
defender can put them at ease. One defender described the district
courthouse she practices in as "overwhelmingly white. [It] has a negative reputation with [defendants] of color, especially Black people ...
[T]he judges are all white, the prosecutors are all white, the sheriffs
are all white, the courtroom personnel is all white ... my personnel in
the public defender office is mostly white." 2 33 Thus, "when they see
me . . . I'm the only voice that [they] have that can identify with
[them]." 234 A federal defender from a major metropolitan jurisdiction
explained the impact her appearance and slight Caribbean accent
have on her clients, many of whom are Black Caribbean. "[T]hey feel
more comfortable." 2 3 5 She notices her clients observe that she wears
229 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 40, at Standard 4-3.3(a) ("In the initial meeting
with a client, defense counsel should begin the process of establishing an effective
attorney-client relationship. This includes assuring the client of confidentiality [and]
establishing trust .... ").
230 See Bryant, supra note 18, at 42 ("Lawyers and clients who do not share the same
culture face special challenges in developing a trusting relationship in which genuine and
accurate communication can occur.").
231 But see Defender No. 10 ("My Blackness, my womanness, my relative appearance of
youth, gets them more concerned in some ways. [They think]: 'She's young, she's Black,
she's a she. She doesn't know what she's doing. She's going to let the judge run all over
her.' And so I'm aware that's probably what they're coming to the table with [and that I
have to address these concerns in my advocacy.]").
232 Defender No. 12 ("[I]t makes me more efficient.").
233 Defender No. 5.
234 Id.
235 Defender No. 3.
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her hair naturally, in locs. 236 "[Their thinking is:] If you have some
understanding of where I come from, then this is going to be some-

thing that you care about and pay attention to, and are invested in. As
opposed to you thinking that I am someone so different from you, and
forgettable in some way." 237 Research shows that the inverse is true,
anti-Black bias can result in a defender being less invested and
spending less time on a Black defendant's case, which can then impact

a defendant's willingness to share information that could help advance
the defense.2 38

In these examples, the lawyers' mere presence engendered trust
with their same-race clients. Race in these instances acted as a lifeboat
amid potentially hostile, biased waters. This lifeline-the initial connection-can then translate into meaningful differences in representation. As discussed below, the bond can help open the lines of
substantive communication that may otherwise remain closed to or
misunderstood by non-Black or less culturally aware counsel.

Quality of Communication

1.

Communication is a key aspect of the attorney-client relationship
and a central feature of the Sixth Amendment right to effective
counsel. One of defense counsel's core duties is "to communicate and
keep the client informed and advised of significant developments and
potential options and outcomes." 239 Yet, problems with communication are the most frequent basis of bar complaints against lawyers. 240
Within criminal defense, a breakdown in communication can result in
the deprivation of the right to counsel. 241 It can also serve as good
cause for the court to grant a defendant's motion to substitute
236

See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another HairPiece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis

Under Title VII, 98 GEO L.J. 1079, 1080 n.2 (2010) (describing locs or locks as "sections of
hair that are 'permanently locked together and cannot be unlocked without cutting"'
(citation omitted)).
237 Defender No. 3.
238 See Richardson &

Goff, supra note 22, at 2636-38 (explaining that anti-Black bias
causes white defenders to "unconsciously exhibit hostility" that "adversely affect[s] the
attorney's triage decisions," which, in turn, makes clients less likely to be forthcoming with
information helpful to the case).
239 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 40, at Standard 4-1.3(d).
240 Stephen B. Schemenauer, What We've Got Here . . . Is A Failure . . . To
Communicate: A Statistical Analysis of the Nation's Most Common Ethical Complaint, 30

HAmLNE L. REv. 629, 645-46 (2007) (surveying the fifty states and D.C. and finding that
"[t]he most common nationwide complaint is a 'failure to communicate"').
241 Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 1970) (granting habeas relief for
denial of right to counsel where trial court forced defendant to trial over defendant's

motions to substitute appointed counsel with whom there was a complete breakdown in
the relationship).
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counse. 242 This Subsection demonstrates how same-race representation can ease communication between the attorney and client and substantively benefit the client's case.
The few studies that measure indigent defendant satisfaction
reveal that communication problems abound. 243 Research shows that
differences in race, gender, class, and other cultural identities can
create barriers to communication. 244 To compensate for race-based
barriers in communication with their clients, some lawyers rely on
non-white colleagues, often non-lawyers, to act as cultural translators.

One public defender was the only Black lawyer in her office when
hired, despite practicing in a jurisdiction where approximately ninety
percent of her clients are Black. 245 "I've had situations, right before a

trial, [where] my white colleague [asked]: There's no way we should
be going to trial. All the evidence is against us. I can't get through to
my client. Can you talk to them?" 246 Although she often agreed to

speak with her colleagues' clients in these instances, she lamented that
those situations can be difficult because she does not know the facts of
47
the case, the investigation, nor the viability of the case for trial.2 A

supervising defender with whom I spoke shared an example from her
practice:
There was someone in lockup and one of my [supervisee] attorneys,

who was white, was having a difficult time communicating [to the
Black client] what the judge had just said during conference. He
asked me . . . to help him explain it to the client because the client
thought that my attorney was "selling him out" .

. .

. All he was

doing was relaying what the judge told him to inform his client. By
me coming back there, I was like, "look, no one is trying to sell you
out. We're not working with the system. We're not working with the

judge. We are here to help you." . . . [M]e being there; the tension
just went down. [I was able to bring a sense of] familiarity. 248

However, there is something lost between the lawyer and the
client when the lawyer is unable to serve as the primary source of
242 Benitez v. United States, 521 F.3d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting trial court has an
obligation to inquire into source of dissatisfaction between defendant and counsel, and
may grant motion to withdraw or substitute counsel if there is a showing of good cause).
243 See, e.g., Campbell et al., supra note 18, at 761-63 (finding common themes among
defendants' complaints, including perception that their public defenders did not listen to
them, spent little and low-quality time with them, did not inform them about what would
happen during upcoming court proceedings, and did not inform them about certain rights).
244 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
245 Defender No. 1.
246
247

Id.
Id.

248 Defender No. 5.
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information about the case. This barrier can corrode trust and disrupt
the relationship.

Same-race representation can negate the need for a cultural
translator and allow the attorney and client to establish trust more

readily. The head of a state office, who is Black, discussed a case she
worked on with co-counsel who were white. She shared an anecdote

from the client's perspective who described a shift in representation
when she joined the team: "He was often told 'that doesn't make
sense' or 'you shouldn't say that,' when it was things I picked up on
automatically and said: 'well no, that makes perfect sense. I get it.' "249

Her presence on the team and the information she gathered from the
client helped shape the theory of defense. 250
2.

Development of Trust
Another foundational component of the attorney-client relation-

ship is trust. The ABA Standards instruct criminal defense attorneys,
"[i]mmediately upon appointment .

.

. to establish a relationship of

trust and confidence" with the client. 25 1 The Court has recognized that
crucial "decisions can best be made, and counsel's duties most effectively discharged, if the attorney and the defendant have a relation-

ship characterized by trust and confidence."

25

2

Just as cross-racial

representation can create a barrier to communication, it can also serve

as an obstacle to establishing trust.25 3 Conversely, same-race representation provides the potential for lawyers and clients to develop a
trusting relationship based on a perception of shared experiences and
understanding.

Many of the Black public defenders with whom I spoke explained
that their same-race clients perceived them to be less a "part of the
system" and thus more trustworthy than their white colleagues. 254

&

249 Defender No. 4.
250 Id.
251 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 40, at Standard 4-3.1(a); see also Janet Moore

Andrew L.B. Davies, Knowing Defense, 14 OHmo ST. J.

CRIM.

L. 345, 362 (2017) ("Meeting

new clients, and winning their trust and respect, is a crucial part of defenders' daily
activity.").
252 Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 21 & n.4 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-3.1(a) (2d ed. 1980)).
253 Campbell et al., supra note 18, at 764 (finding distrust between public defenders and
clients due to the influence of racial and class differences); Bryant, supra note 18, at 42
(explaining that differences in culture between the lawyer and client can create challenges
in developing trust).
254 Former public defender and current law professor, Kenneth Troccoli wrote about the
common pairing of Black indigent defendants with white public defenders in his 2002

article, "I Want a Black Lawyer to Represent Me": Addressing a Black Defendant's
Concerns with Being Assigned a White Court-Appointed Lawyer, 20 LAw & INEQ. 1 (2002).
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This reflects the fact that many Black indigent defendants racialize the
system as white. Thus, when Black defenders and their Black clients

appear together amidst the overwhelmingly white demographics of
the courtroom-where the judges, prosecutors, and court officers are
often all white-it creates a sense of solidarity between them.25 5
"There is a different relationship that's built [between my Black clients and me] .... They trust me [because] they see nothing but white
. . . in the courtroom." 25 6 This perceived distance between Black

public defenders and the "system" enables Black indigent defendants
to more readily develop trust with their same-race defenders. One
defender described the currency her race plays when interacting with

her clients over the phone. Given the nature of her practice-in court
daily-she often "meets" her clients for the first time over the phone.

"Over the phone, they think I'm a white girl [so] I have to let them
know, I have to identify myself [as a Black woman], because it definitely changes the tone and tenor [of the conversation]. "257 After

revealing her race and referencing a shared experience, she immediately hears a shift in her clients' voices and notices that they tend to be
more open and forthcoming with information after the disclosure.25 8
B.

Black Defenders Can Mitigate Anti-Black Bias

As set forth below, Black public defenders may be able to more

readily see, hear, and understand their Black clients and, as importantly, Black clients tend to more readily see, hear, and understand

their Black lawyers. 25 9 At each turn in the system, a Black indigent
defendant faces potentially hostile decisionmakers whose anti-Black
bias may cloud judgment and detrimentally impact the defendant's
case. 260 Public defenders, like all of us, harbor anti-Black bias. 261 Such
In it, he described the common sentiment of Black clients that the system is racist and
rigged against them, which includes white public defenders "'whether racist or not, [who]
are part of that system."' Id. at 17; see also Johnathan D. Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer
When You Went to Court? No, I Had a Public Defender, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION 4,

6 (1971) (revealing that many indigent defendants viewed their appointed lawyers as
affiliated with the prosecution or as "an agent of the prosecution").
255 See Defender No. 5; Defender No. 9.

256 Defender No. 1.

257 Defender No. 9. An appellate defender explained that she also regularly "meets" her
Black clients over the phone and that when they later meet in person, she could tell that
"[t]hey were so happy that I wasn't white. 'She's one of us!' [The client's mood shift] was
remarkable." Defender No. 8.
258 Defender No. 8.
259 Cf DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 26, at 11 (discussing the concept of a
"unique voice of color," which holds that minorities have a presumed competence to speak
about race and racism that their white counterparts do not have).
260 GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 20, at 17-39 (describing the racialized culture of
Cook County, Illinois criminal courts, including that defense counsel, who are
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bias can manifest in small or large ways, such as defense counsel mistaking another Black person in a courtroom for their client, 262 or in
negotiating a less favorable plea agreement on behalf of a Black client
relative to an otherwise similarly situated white client. 263 However,
research shows that Black defenders harbor less anti-Black bias than
do their non-Black counterparts. 264 Moreover, Black defenders may
be more likely to recognize racism and raise race-based challenges by

virtue of their experience as Black people. In this way, Black defense
counsel are particularly well-situated to challenge anti-Black racial
bias whenever it arises in the client's case. 26 5 This Section argues that

Black public defenders can serve as a safeguard against anti-Black
racial bias in the criminal legal system.
Given

their intimate

understanding

of the social meaning

assigned to Black people in this country, Black defenders may have
both the legal and experiential awareness to challenge anti-Black
racism in their client's case. Conversely, "a white attorney who represents a client of color may not be prepared to fully relate to the client

if she approaches the client with a set of assumptions that do not apply
beyond her dominant culture." 266 Black public defenders with whom I
spoke shared examples where they believe their shared race helped
their advocacy on behalf of Black clients. For instance, a defender
now serving as the executive director of an office recalled a case

involving a young Black client facing serious felony charges. The
defender joined two white lawyers who the court had already
appointed. There was a "difference in how [the client] felt when he
had lawyers who were not his same race, and then . . . that changed
overwhelming white, often perpetuate the court system's racial abuses when interacting
with their indigent clients, who are overwhelmingly Black).
261 Richardson & Goff, supra note 22.
262 CLAIR, supra note 13, at 75 (observing instances of mistaken identity where white
lawyers approached groups of Black people "looking questioningly" for their client or

"assuming" that some other Black person was their client).
263 See Edkins, supra note 37 (finding that defense attorneys are more likely to

recommend plea bargains for Black clients that impose harsher sentences than plea
bargains they would recommend for similarly situated white clients).
264 Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 22, at 1553.
265 See Gonzales Rose, supra note 182, at 2258 (explaining that people of color have the

competency to recognize and speak about race and racism).
266 Roland Acevedo, Edward Hosp & Rachel Pomerantz, Race and Representation: A
Study of Legal Aid Attorneys and Their Perceptions of the Significance of Race, 18 BUFF.
PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 18-19 (2000); see also Lindsey Webb, Slave Narrativesand the Sentencing

Court, 42 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.

CHANGE

125, 149 (2018) (proposing abolitionist

approaches to individual client representation but acknowledging that "[b]ecause the

.

majority of defense lawyers have not been incarcerated and are not people of color, ..
they may be ill-equipped to effectively identify and address systemic racial inequities in our
systems of imprisonment").
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when I came into the picture. . . . Some of that was me feeding [new]
267
information [back to the team] to build our theory [of defense]."
She recalled that her representation "allowed [the client] to open up
268
As a result, the
more. It allowed him to feel heard and understood."
defense, and
the
client,
of
the
picture
robust
a
more
had
defense team
represented.
better
felt
mitigation. Just as significant, the client
Black defenders' mere presence in the courtroom may also miti-

gate the impact of or dissuade the prosecution and/or trial judge from
engaging in anti-Black racism. As discussed above regarding the benefits of same-race representation in education, this is known as passive
effect, where the mere presence of a teacher-or public defender-of

the same race can render a benefit. 269 A Black lawyer's presence may
provide a powerful antidote to the presumption of criminality and
dangerousness that society, including jurors, judges, and prosecutors
assign to Black people. Professor and legal historian Kenneth Mack

observes that Black civil rights lawyers had the power through their
"brilliant" performances in Southern courts to transform the thinking
of white observers. 270 Research on race in the legal profession and its
impact on criminal cases shows that "more persons of color making

decisions in the justice system" can "mitigate disparities in justice outcomes.1"271 A study on sentencing indicated that when "consciousness
and awareness of racial discrimination [are] elevated" among "decision makers [who are] members of underrepresented groups," it can
2 72
have a positive outcome on defendants of color.
When facing a Black defense attorney, prosecutors may also be

less likely to rely on race when exercising peremptory strikes to

remove prospective jurors. In response to a Black defender's Batson
v. Kentucky challenge, 2 73 trial judges may think more critically about a

prosecutor's purported race-neutral reasoning for removing a nonwhite juror. Black defenders may also be more likely to object to a
267 Defender No. 4.
268

Id.

269 See Egalite et al., supra note 151, at 45; Dee, supra note 151, at 196-97; Dee, supra

note 176, at 159.
270 KENNETH W. MACK,

REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE

CREATION

OF THE CIVIL

RIGHTS LAWYER 83, 105-08 (2012) (providing detailed account of Charles Houston's
defense of George Crawford, a Black man charged with murdering a wealthy socialite and
her maid in Virginia, where "[o]ne upper-class local woman reportedly confessed that
'[a]fter hearing that brilliant man, I can no longer hold the views I previously held of the
Negro"' (alteration in original)).
271 Ryan D. King, Kecia R. Johnson & Kelly McGeever, Demography of the Legal
Profession and Racial Disparities in Sentencing, 44 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 1, 26 (2010).
272 Id.

273 See 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (establishing three-part test to determine whether counsel
unlawfully relied on race when exercising a peremptory strike on a prospective juror).
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and dehumanizing language,

whereas a non-Black defender may remain silent because such language may not register as offensive or unlawful. 274 The impact defense
counsel's race may have on the prosecutor's and judge's actions
regarding racial discrimination in jury selection is an area ripe for
additional research.
Black defenders may also be more attuned than white defenders
to recognizing their client's humanity beyond the criminal charges. 2 75
This can impact counsel's temporal investment and performance

throughout the case. 27 6 One appellate defender whose client population is exclusively Black men explained that she observes a difference
between the way her Black clients interact with her and with her white
colleagues. 27 7 For example, one client "is very open with me and tells
me the truth, and when he is speaking with [my white colleague] he is
stern, reserved, and professional . .. [and] he's [no longer] forthcoming." 278 She recognizes that the client's openness is beneficial to
her as an advocate, and more importantly, to the case because the
information from her client informs the issues in the appeal and the

way she presents the client's narrative before the court.279
Investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence during a
client's sentencing hearing-in both capital and non-capital cases-is
part of constitutionally effective representation.280 The goal of such
evidence is to humanize the client beyond the criminal conviction and
secure a favorable outcome on behalf of the client. In a capital case,
when the defendant is Black, the necessity to humanize the client is
274

See Acevedo et al., supra note 266, at 15 ("The subjective experiences of people of

specific backgrounds shape their worldviews in different ways..

.

. [Accordingly], a set of

circumstances can appear different to members of different identity groups.").
275 Id. (explaining that "whites may be unaware and unfamiliar with the lives of their
clients of color to such an extent that failure to take racial differences into account may
mean missing a large part of the client's story and problem").
276 See Richardson & Goff, supra note 22, at 2634-41 (explaining that racial bias can
impact the amount of time defense counsel spends on a case).
277 Defender No. 8.

Id.
Id.
280 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (finding that defense counsel in a
278
279

capital case has an "obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's
background" to mitigate the offense during sentencing); Miriam S. Gohara, Grace Notes: A
Case for Making Mitigation the Heart of Noncapital Sentencing, 41 AM. J. CruM. L. 41
(2013) (describing the utility of employing capital mitigation evidence development and
presentation to non-capital cases); Hugh M. Mundy, It's Not Just for Death Cases
Anymore: How Capital Mitigation Investigation Can Enhance Experiential Learning and
Improve Advocacy in Law School Non-Capital Criminal Defense Clinics, 50 CAL. W. L.

REv. 31 (2013) (explaining the importance and effectiveness of applying principles from
capital mitigation development to non-capital cases after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.

220 (2005), which allowed federal judges to depart from the sentencing guidelines).
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heightened given the tendency for jurors-who are overwhelmingly

white 28 1-to
defendants.

rely on race to render harsher punishment to Black
28 2

In non-capital cases, such evidence is vital to help Black

defendants combat presumptions of future dangerousness and to
address the propensity for rehabilitation.2 83 For Black clients, this
means counsel must be able to investigate and understand the impact
that race, ethnicity, and culture have had on the client's life. 284 To perform these tasks effectively, counsel must have cultural competency.2 85 Given their experiential awareness of the central role that

race plays in a person's life, Black defenders often have the baseline
competency to perform this work well and effectively on behalf of

their same-race clients.
C.

Limitations

The argument that Black defenders could help improve represen-

tation for Black defendants raises concerns and questions. What
would this mean for white indigent defendants who may want to
choose a white defender? In short, the system is already well-situated
281 See EQUAL JUST.

1NITIATIVE,

RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: RACIAL VIOLENCE

AFTER THE CIVIL WAR, 1865-1876, at 14 (2020), https://eji.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/

reconstruction-in-america-report.pdf (noting that "people of color are dramatically
underrepresented on juries as a result of racially biased use of peremptory strikes" and that
"[t]his phenomenon is especially prevalent in capital cases"); ELISABETH SEMEL, DAGEN

DOwNARD,

EMMA

BERKELEY

L. SCH.

TOLMAN,

ANNE

WEIS,

DEATH PENALTY

DANIELLE

CRAIG

CLINIC, WHITEWASHING

CALIFORNIA PERPETUATES THE DISCRIMINATORY

&

CHELSEA HANLOCK,
THE JURY BOx: How

EXCLUSION OF BLACK

AND LATINX

JURORS, at v (2020) ("California prosecutors' use of peremptory challenges to exclude
African Americans and Latinx citizens from juries is still pervasive.").
282

See Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Paul G. Davies, Valerie J. Purdie-Vaughns & Sheri Lynn

Johnson, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts
Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCH. SCI. 383, 384 (2006) (finding that the more

phenotypically Black the defendant looked in white victim cases, the more likely jurors
would vote for death); Jelani Jefferson Exum, Should Death Be So Different?: Sentencing
Purposes and Capital Jury Decisions in an Era of Smart on Crime Sentencing Reform, 70

ARK. L. REV. 227, 243-44 (2017) (explaining that implicit racial biases may cause
predominately white juries not to give effect to mitigating evidence when the defendant is
Black and to inappropriately add weight to aggravating factors when the victim is white).
283 See Mundy, supra note 280, at 46 n.104.
284 See ABA Death Penalty Guidelines, supra note 40, at 1021-22 ("Counsel's duty to

investigate and present mitigating evidence is now well established..

..

'[P]enalty phase

preparation requires extensive and generally unparalleled investigation into personal and

family history[,]' . . . [including the client's] experiences of racism or other social or ethnic
bias; [and] cultural or religious influences . . . ." (footnote omitted)); Craig Haney,
Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism, Structural Mitigation,

and the Empathetic Divide, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1557, 1580-81, 1587, 1589 (2004)
(describing the need for capital defense attorneys to center Black clients' social histories

and their race-based experiences, including structural racism and racial discrimination).
285 See Holdman & Seeds, supra note 25, at 883 ("[Q]ultural competency is essential to
the ability of capital defense teams to discover and reveal the humanity of the accused.").
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to accommodate their requests for same-race representation given the
demographics of the legal profession and public defenders. And what
of women defendants, defendants who identify as lesbian, gay,

bisexual, transgender, or queer, or defendants from any other nondominant group who may want an attorney who shares their identity,
or a heightened understanding of their identity, to represent them?
They too should have the option to choose counsel with cultural competency, a lawyer who they can trust and who understands them.
These are skills the Supreme Court should deem part of general com-

petency and the ability to provide adequate defense representation.
However, no other group of marginalized people has the same presumption of criminality, dangerousness, and irredeemability assigned

to them as do Black people. 286 This is why this Article focuses on the
experiences of Black indigent defendants and why same-race representation is critical.

That said, this Article does not assume that all Black indigent
defendants would select Black lawyers if given the autonomy to
choose counsel, nor does it assume that a Black defense lawyer would
automatically better serve a Black client. Instead, pragmatically, a
Black defendant may want a white lawyer because Black lawyers may
face the very same anti-Black bias in the courtroom as Black indigent

defendants. 287 One Black public defender in the South recalled a prearraignment meeting with a new client, who was Black. The client was
older and had several contacts with the criminal legal system over the

decades. Upon laying eyes on appointed counsel, the client yelled: "I
want a Jew!" 288 A head of office conveyed the sentiments she witnesses coming from some of the Black indigent defendants in the

Midwest jurisdiction where she practices.
286 See MUHAMMAD, supra note 34, at 35--87 ("When Hoffman announced that
Chicago's 'Italians, Polanders and Russians' lived under conditions 'without question more
severe' than [B]lacks, and [B]lacks still showed the 'most decided tendency towards crime
in the large cities,' he unequivocally marked the [B]lack urban migrant as a criminal of
exceptional measure." (quoting FREDERICK L. HOFFMAN, RACE TRAITS AND TENDENCIES
OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO (1896))).
287 See, e.g., Meagan Flynn, 'Lawyering While Black': Maryland Deputy Accused
Attorney of Being a Suspect, Complaint Says, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/03/28/lawyering-while-black-maryland-deputy-

accused-attorney-being-suspect-complaint-says (reporting that a deputy sheriff detained a
Black lawyer and required him to show proof that he was an attorney, after the lawyer

appeared in court on behalf of his client who had failed to appear); Bell, supra note 79, at
196 (noting that Black lawyers have to "contend with courthouse racism"); BRYAN
STEVENSON, JUST MERCY 165 (Spiegel & Grau 2014) (explaining that he, a bearded Black
man, dresses "as conservatively as possible for court," so that he would "meet the court's

expectation of what a lawyer looked like").
288 Defender No. 13.
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Black clients are highly aware of the way white attorneys are
treated by judges, court officers, [and] prosecutors. They get it. They
get what white privilege is ... they see it. And sometimes they want
that kind of representation. Because they're making a calcul[ated
decision] about [it] . . . "This is a court appointed lawyer, I'm
already . . . screwed, but . . . is there a way that . . . this [white]

person is gonna do [right] for me?" And even if they have doubts
about whether or not . . . [a white] attorney . . . is really for them,
they recognize that . . . whiteness lets that attorney do more than
maybe a Black attorney [c]ould. 28 9
Black defendants may also want a white lawyer because they
view Black lawyers as less competent than white lawyers given their
own internalized racism. 2 90 However, giving indigent defendants the
autonomy to choose counsel addresses these concerns. The expansion
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice would enable all
indigent defendants to select the lawyer who they believe would best
represent them. For a Black defendant, this may mean a non-Black

defense lawyer.
Conversely, Black defendants may overwhelmingly want Black

lawyers to represent them. The system is not equipped to handle such
a demand due to the underrepresentation of Black people in the legal

profession, and specifically in the indigent defense community. The
high demand for Black representation could create a Black "tax,"
resulting in burdening Black public defenders with even higher
caseloads beyond the systemic burdens of indigent defense work. A
similar phenomenon occurs in academia where faculty of color are

underrepresented. When hired, faculty of color "are often expected to
occupy a certain set of [additional] roles: to serve as mentors, inspirations, and guides" and to serve as "the racial conscience of their institutions." 2 91 Those in higher education refer to these duties as
"invisible labor," 2 92 which can detract from faculty of color's ability to
perform the primary duties for which the institution hired them. Likewise, even higher caseloads requiring more emotional investment

could prove detrimental to the quality of work Black defenders are
able to perform.
Defender No. 10.
290 One Defender, describing initial meetings with indigent Black clients, remarked:
289

"When I was a younger attorney, there was some skepticism. Everyone has a vision of what

a lawyer looks like, and unfortunately, because we're already in the minority in the legal
field and in the public defender field, people expect an older, white haired man to walk
into the room." See Defender No. 3.
291 Patricia A. Matthew, What Is Faculty Diversity Worth to a University?, ATLANTIC

(Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.comleducation/archive/2016/11/what-is-facultydiversity-worth-to-a-university/508334.
292

Id.
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There may also be differences in class and education level
between Black lawyers and their indigent clients. 293 Despite the unifying social meaning attached to Black people in this country, class-

and education-level

divisions can result in different experiential

awareness. Professor Mack discusses the tension that Black civil rights
lawyers experienced when thrust into a representative role for their

clients. 294 However, one defender, acknowledging the obvious differences between herself and her Black clients, explained how their
sameness trumped those relatively minor divisions.
[T]hey know our backgrounds are different, they know that we
didn't necessarily grow up in the same neighborhood, or they understand that I'm educated and maybe they're not, or we're from different regional places, but they also have the comfort that they
don't have to explain their humanity to me. That part I get. Right? I
have Black sons, so they don't have to explain to me that they are a
man. We can just talk about the case. 295

Instead of expending energy overcoming the presumption of
criminality and dangerousness that society assigns to Black people, 296
the defender and her client can dive directly into the case. This is less
likely to occur as seamlessly for non-Black defenders.
Black people's diverse experiences and the potential for a Black
tax do not negate the utility of research and analysis on how counsel's

race may impact indigent representation. Nor do these concerns
eclipse the benefit that many Black defendants can derive from samerace representation. This research is more developed in other contexts, such as political science. In Behind the Mule: Race and Class in
African-American Politics, Michael Dawson developed the concept of

"linked fate" to describe Black people's political cohesion motivated
by the perception that the individual's fate is linked to the shared

identity group's interests when making political decisions,

like

voting. 2 97 Despite the myriad differences among Black people293 See CLAIR, supra note 13, at 74-76.
294 MACK, supra note 270, at 4-5 ("[A] representative

[B]lack person often had to be as

unlike most members of the minority group as possible. Black Americans themselves often
took great pride in the achievements of atypical members of their race."). Meanwhile,
"both [B]lacks and whites often demanded that the representative be an 'authentic' [B]lack

person-someone as much like the masses of [B]lack people as possible." Id. at 5.

295 Defender No. 12.
296 See Stevenson, supra note 196, at 4 (describing his own
experience of being
threatened at gunpoint by a police officer while parked outside his own apartment and
reflecting that "young [B]lack men[] are burdened with a presumption of guilt and
dangerousness").
297 MICHAEL C. DAwsON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICANAMERICAN POLrTICs 76-77 (1994) (describing "linked fate" as the "link[] between
perceptions of self-interest [and] perceptions of racial group interests," as measured by the
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Dawson closely studied economic difference-Black people "have
displayed extraordinary political unity in their voting decisions" since
the 1960s. 298
Although Dawson recognized the diversity among Black people in
America, he argued that "the strength of individuals' sense of responsibility to each other and to the community as a whole" trumped the
differences. 299 Subsequent empirical analysis on identity group cohesion shows that Black people, relative to Hispanic people, nonHispanic white people, and Asian people, demonstrate the greatest
group cohesion.300 Taken to a broader context, it is the phenomenon

that one's prospects are linked to the success of the race. Dawson's
theory is instructive here, where Black public defenders may be motivated to zealously represent their Black clients out of a shared sense of
linked fate. As one Black public defender described it: "[I]t's me and
you up here [in court]. We're standing together as a team. We are a
united front against everything that's coming at us . . ."301
D.

Opportunity for Growth

Although the ideas in this Article may appear provocative and
radical to some, they are not unattainable nor unreasonable. Exam-

ining the potential benefits that expanding choice could bring to Black
indigent defendants helps advance discourse on undertheorized areas
of the criminal law and practice.
The ideas in this Article make clear that more research is needed

on racially congruent representation and on exercising choice of
counsel from the client's perspective. As a general matter, there is a

dearth of qualitative research on indigent defendants' experiences and
perceptions. 302 Much of the existing research on indigent defense
survey question, "Do you think that what happens generally to the [B]lack people in this
country will have something to do with what happens in your life?"). I thank Kendall
Thomas for introducing me to Dawson's work.
298 Id. at 130.
299 Id. at 98-99.
300 Gabriel R. Sanchez & Edward D. Vargas, Taking a Closer Look at Group Identity:
The Link Between Theory and Measurement of Group Consciousnessand Linked Fate, 69

POL. RscH. Q. 160 (2016) (measuring three types of group consciousness-commonality,
perceived discrimination, and collective action-and finding that Black people had the
greatest overall level of group consciousness across the three dimensions).
301 Defender No. 9.
302 See Marla Sandys & Heather Pruss, Correlates of Satisfaction Among Clients of a
Public Defender Agency, 14 OHO ST. J. CRIM. L. 431, 431 (2017) (describing the gap in

indigent defense research from the client's perspective and presenting findings from a
client satisfaction study from a rural public defender agency); Janet Moore, Ellen
Yaroshefsky & Andrew L.B. Davies, Privileging Public Defense Research, 69 MERCER L.
REv. 771 (2018) (noting lack of research on indigent defendant communication with
counsel).
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focuses on quantitative data regarding charging and sentencing. However, there is limited information and analysis on client perceptions of
representation and on attorney-client relationships. 303 Such research

could help advance the argument for expanding counsel of choice to
indigent defendants and for increasing racial diversity among indigent

defense providers.
The ideas in this Article also encourage greater attention to how

jurisdictions might implement choice of counsel for indigent defendants. Even without a constitutional mandate, local jurisdictions can
begin to explore this possibility.
Although the Comal County pilot program was small in scope,

the results seemed to indicate defendants who chose their own lawyer
experienced better case outcomes relative to their non-choice counterparts, including shorter sentences. 30 4 Enabling choice may be eas-

iest in small and rural jurisdictions, where the court appoints counsel
to indigent defendants from a list of private attorneys. As Schulhofer

and Friedman theorized, appointed counsel would have incentives to
offer higher quality services so that defendants select them.305
However, in larger jurisdictions where the local government and/
or non-profit organizations provide indigent defense representation,
extending choice would be more of an undertaking. In those settings,
defendants might select counsel from a list of employees from a certain agency; such a list might include details about each lawyer's background, experience, and specialized training. With clients driving the

selection process, indigent defense providers would need to conform
their hiring, training, and services to better meet client demands. This
would necessarily include cultural competency training and hiring
public defenders from populations that are more reflective of the cli-

ents served.
CONCLUSION

Regardless of whether the Court extends the right to counsel of
choice to indigent defendants, perhaps benefiting Black defendants,

there is still a dearth of Black public defenders. The arguments in this
Article require indigent defense providers to prioritize recruiting
more Black lawyers and instituting cultural competency training to
ensure that all lawyers can provide effective cross-cultural representa-

tion. Such training is largely absent from many public defender
303 Campbell et al., supra note 18, at 751-52 (describing the lack of qualitative data on
indigent client experience and satisfaction and endeavoring to bridge the gap).
304 Burnett, supra note 218, at 317-18.

305 Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 41, at 104.
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offices. However, these priorities cannot start in practice. Law schools
have an obligation to prioritize diversity in the profession and to prepare students for practice. Although cross-cultural lawyering has long
been promoted in clinical legal education, 306 many law students grad307
Moreover, the releuate without ever having enrolled in a clinic.

vant doctrinal courses-criminal law, criminal procedure, and
evidence-fail to adequately prepare students for client-facing
work. 308 In these ways, improving the representation options for
Black indigent defendants will ultimately improve representation for

all indigent defendants.

306 See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 18, at 40 ("By teaching students cross-cultural lawyering

skills and perspectives, we make the invisible more visible and thus help students
understand the reactions that they and the legal system may have towards clients and that
clients may have towards them.").
307 DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE TROUBLE wrrH LAWYERS 130 (2015) (noting that fewer
than five percent of schools require students to undertake clinical training and a majority
of students graduate without taking a clinic).

308 Shaun Ossei-Owusu, The New Penal Bureaucrats (U. Pa. Carey L. Sch., Working

3 69 67
1 1 (arguing
Paper, Nov. 4, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
as well
inequality,
gender
and
racial
to
that doctrinal criminal legal education is inattentive
as to poverty, leaving graduates ill-prepared to combat these issues in practice).
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